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INCOMPETENCE TO MAINTAIN A DIVORCE
ACTION: WHEN BREAKING UP IS ODD TO
DO
DOUGLAS MOSSMANt
AMANDA N. SHOEMAKER"
I.

INTRODUCTION

If a married person who has not been adjudicated
incompetent' seeks a divorce for reasons that sound very odd,
bizarre, or crazy,2 how should the trial court 3 respond? If the
t Director, Glenn M. Weaver Institute of Law and Psychiatry, University of
Cincinnati College of Law; Adjunct Professor, Department of Psychiatry and
Behavioral Neuroscience, University of Cincinnati College of Medicine. B.A., Oberlin
College, 1976; M.D., University of Michigan Medical School, 1981.
" Fellow, Glenn M. Weaver Institute of Law and Psychiatry, University of
Cincinnati College of Law; B.A., Miami (Ohio) University, 2005; J.D., University of
Cincinnati College of Law, 2009.
The authors thank Professor Margaret Drew for her helpful comments on an
earlier version of the manuscript.
I This Article focuses on the circumstances of legally competent personspersons, that is, who have not been adjudicated incompetent to handle their own
affairs and finances. An adjudication of incompetence has traditionally placed limits
on whether an individual may initiate divorce proceedings. See discussion infra Part
IV.B.
2 Here, we use "crazy" with the same intent and for the same reasons as has
Professor Stephen Morse:
I use the word "crazy" advisedly and with no lack of respect for either
disordered persons or the professionals who try to help them.. . . I chose
the word "crazy" because I believe that it is the best generic term to
describe the type of behavior that leads to a diagnosis or label of mental
disorder. At the same time, it avoids begging questions about whether the
crazy person was capable of behaving less crazily.... I prefer to use a
nonjargon word to describe the type of behavior-crazy behavior-with
which the law is concerned in insanity defense cases.
Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL.
L. REV. 777, 780 n.4 (1985); see also Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and
Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 529 (1978).
Although this Article does not deal with the insanity defense, the term "crazy"-an
everyday word that does imply exercise of any clinical expertise-still has the
advantage of holding diagnostic judgment in abeyance. We have used "odd" in this
Article's title with similar intentions and for similar reasons. However, subsequent
parts of this Article suggest that the odd or crazy beliefs that might produce
incompetence to divorce would be those of persons who suffer from severe mental
illnesses.
Here and throughout, "trial court" refers generally to a court of appropriate
jurisdiction with power to decide divorce actions. In various states, this is the court
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trial court knows a husband is seeking to divorce his wife for
reasons that represent symptoms of a severe mental illness, but
the husband understands the key factual implications of
obtaining a divorce-ending the marriage, separating lives and
property-should the trial court allow him to proceed? If not,
how should the trial court respond to the husband's petition, and
under what authority? In an era when "no-fault" and unilateral
divorce laws offer unhappy spouses wide latitude to dissolve their
marriages, when-if ever-should a psychotic motivation for
seeking divorce justify a trial court's blocking the individual's
desire?
Because a concrete example may help acquaint readers with
the types of situations and mental symptoms addressed in this
Article, we present the following fictional case history.4
A.

Case Vignette

John Doe, a retired architect, married his wife Jane when
they were both in their twenties. During their four-decade
marriage, they struck all who knew them as a loving, happy
couple. When their children reached their teens, Mrs. Doe
started her own jewelry business. Two decades later, Mrs. Doe's
company had more than twenty employees. Mr. Doe admired his
wife's accomplishments as a businesswoman, and he often spoke
of her success to their friends.
Two years into retirement, however, Mr. Doe began
criticizing his wife for spending so much time away from home.
Mrs. Doe actually was working fewer hours than previously, and
she had delegated many business responsibilities to employees so
that she and her husband could take long vacations together. A
few months later, Mr. Doe became openly angry each time his
wife left for work. One evening, Mrs. Doe asked her husband
why he had been acting this way. "You know exactly why!" Mr.
Doe replied angrily. "Do you think I don't know what you do
there all day?" Mr. Doe then told his wife that he knew she was
of common pleas, see, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-50 (2009), family court, see, e.g.,
HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-41 (2009), district court, see, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-715
(2010), or domestic relations court, see, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-12-1-4 (LexisNexis
2009).
Though this case vignette is fictional, it describes the plausible development of
a psychotic disorder and its possible consequences. The first author bases this
assertion on his more than three decades of clinical experience.
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seducing the young men she hired as managers. When Mrs. Doe
laughed at what sounded like a ridiculous statement, her
husband-previously a very even-tempered man-screamed at
her and berated her for mocking him.
Mr. Doe's accusations continued over the next several
months, and their relationship deteriorated. Mr. Doe had always
let Mrs. Doe handle family finances because she was much better
at this than he. Now, he spent hours going over the couple's
bank statements and often claimed that funds were missing.
When Mrs. Doe showed that this was not true by pointing out her
husband's arithmetic errors, Mr. Doe accused her of tricking him
and of establishing secret "trusts for trysts" where she stashed
funds to support her lovers. When Mrs. Doe received an
occasional business-related call at home, Mr. Doe insisted on
speaking to the caller, and once he even pushed her aside so he
could get to the phone first. He made copious notes about the
phone calls' times and sources, and he asked callers rude
questions.
Eventually, Mr. Doe refused to let callers speak to Mrs. Doe
at all, telling her, "I love you, Jane, but if this continues, I'll have
no choice but to call the IRS and the FBI." When Mrs. Doe asked
what her husband was talking about, Mr. Doe told her he had
finally "put two and two together." For some time, he had "heard
rumors" that his wife's business success came from her
participation in an international "diamond cartel," "back alley
cash deals," and money laundering to hide income. The previous
week, he had obtained "proof," because he had followed Mrs.
Doe and had seen her meet with "smugglers disguised
as Orthodox Jews." Mrs. Doe explained that the men were
diamond merchants who had taken the train from New York City
that morning to meet with her. "Those black hats and beards
may fool the U.S. government," replied Mr. Doe, "but they don't
fool me."
Two weeks later, the Doe's oldest daughter Susan heard a
knock at her back door. It was her frightened-looking father,
who was carrying an old army duffle bag filled with his
belongings. He pleaded with his daughter to let him in. Mr. Doe
had parked on the grass in Susan's backyard so that his car was
not visible from the street. He told Susan that Mrs. Doe wanted
to have him locked up in a psychiatric hospital because he was
planning to "go to the authorities." Not knowing what to think,
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Susan let her father come in, then secretly called her mother.
Mrs. Doe was frantically wondering why her husband had
abruptly driven off without speaking to her. Susan told her
mother that Mr. Doe seemed "frightened but coherent."
Within thirty-six hours, Mr. Doe left Susan's home. As he
headed out the door with his belongings and a newly purchased
suitcase full of cash, he quickly thanked Susan for sheltering
him, and added that "for our mutual safety," Susan should not
ask where he was going or try to follow him. A week later, Mrs.
Doe received notice from an attorney in a nearby city informing
her that Mr. Doe had filed for divorce. Mrs. Doe retained her
own attorney and described what had happened. The attorney
suggested that Mrs. Doe file papers to have her husband
committed to a mental facility. Mrs. Doe had already tried this,
but because her husband was looking after himself adequately,
was not suicidal, and had not threatened anyone, the court would
not act on her affidavit. Mrs. Doe had also looked into getting
her husband a guardian, but this was not possible either as he
would not see a doctor for the necessary examination. Besides,
Mr. Doe was caring for himself properly, and though Mrs. Doe
worried that someone might take advantage of her husband for
financial gain, she had no evidence that Mr. Doe was misusing
his funds.
B. Aims of this Article

For centuries, the law has made provisions for divorces
initiated on behalf of a person previously adjudged incompetent
to manage personal affairs who wishes to leave his or her spouse
or against an incompetent spouse by a competent individual. By
contrast, cases that address persons like Mr. Doe-an individual
who, despite his mental illness, is competent to manage his own
person-appear to be rare.6 Yet a confluence of events and social
6

See discussion infra Part IV.A.

6 We have found just seven published U.S. cases that deal with this matter,

which we review infra Part IV.B. To our knowledge, the scholarly literature contains
just one four-page discussion of this topic. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN ET AL.,
COMPETENCE IN THE LAW: FROM LEGAL THEORY TO CLINICAL APPLICATION 276-79

(2008). Two authors have given more extensive treatment to a related topic,
competence to participate in divorce mediation. See Connie J. A. Beck & Lynda E.
Frost, Defining a Threshold for Client Competence To Participate in Divorce
Mediation, 12 PSYCHOL. PuB. POL'Y & L. 1, 1-2 (2006) [hereinafter Beck & Frost I];
Connie J. A. Beck & Lynda E. Frost, Competence as an Element of "Mediation
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developments over the past half-century have created a legal and
social environment in which cases like Mr. Doe's have become
much more probable:
* Recent legal developments, including the widespread
availability of "no-fault" and unilateral divorce
provisions in statutes, courts' acceptance of the notion
that individuals should be found lacking in specific
legal competencies-rather than globally non compos
mentis- and changes in commitment law that restrict
involuntary hospitalization;
* Social developments, especially the vastly increased
social acceptability of seeking a divorce to resolve
marital distress;
* Trends in medical care, including the move to much
shorter psychiatric hospitalizations, the availability of
pharmacological treatments that produce temporary
resolution of psychoses, and treatment of mentally ill
outside hospitals;
* Epidemiological developments, including a larger older
population susceptible to mental illnesses that
generate paranoia without more global psychiatric
impairment.'
Given the increasing possibility that divorce petitions may be
initiated by individuals like Mr. Doe, this Article suggests that
domestic relations law should recognize a distinct, potential form
of legal incompetence: incompetence to maintain a divorce
action.' In Part II, we review the social and legal trends just

Readiness," 25 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 255, 255 (2008) [hereinafter Beck & Frost II].
Closely related but distinguishable cases involve persons who have been previously
adjudicated as incompetent to manage financial affairs only, but who have not been
adjudicated as incompetent to manage personal affairs. Courts have held that such
individuals may initiate and obtain divorces, unless they are incompetent to do so or
some separate legal reason exists for denying this right. See, e.g., In re Marriage of
Kutchins, 482 N.E.2d 1005, 1007 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); cases discussed infra Part
IV.B. This Article suggests that such persons might be denied the right to seek and
obtain divorces if they meet certain criteria, despite their competence to handle
other personal affairs.
7 See discussion infra Part II.A.
" This Article uses "divorce" as a general term that includes the legal
termination of a marriage and the legal annulment or voiding of a marriage. See 27A
C.J.S. Divorce § 2 (2009) ("In .. . its common and wider use, the term [divorce]
includes the dissolution of a valid marriage and the annulment of a marriage . .").
In various jurisdictions, the terms "dissolution" and "annulment" are used instead of
or in addition to "divorce." See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-40(a) (2009) ("A
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mentioned that may make incompetence to divorce a more likely
phenomenon in the twenty-first century than would have been
the case in previous times. Part III explains what types of
psychiatric conditions might generate the mental problems
experienced by Mr. Doe; conditions that might profoundly affect a
sufferer's judgment about certain specific matters while leaving
most mental functioning intact. Part IV reviews the currently
limited existing case law related to this issue that could be a
source for legal standards or criteria by which courts would
determine whether a petitioner might be barred from suing for
divorce on ground of specific incompetence to divorce.
In Part V, we suggest a rationale for requiring competence of
divorcing parties that is consistent with existing divorce case
law, existing laws, decisions governing other specific
competencies, and with a widely used framework that mental
health professionals use to evaluate and conceptualize
competencies. Part VI describes a model statute on competence
for divorce that legal decisionmakers might use to address the
problems we identify, accompanied by examples of evaluation
questions that might help courts or mental health examiners
discern whether certain "crazy" motivations reflect judgmentdistorting mental illnesses have indeed impaired an individual's
competence to divorce.
II. A CHANGING SOCIAL CONTEXT
A.

More Divorce-EligibleIndividuals

1.

Psychiatric Management of Individuals with Mental Illness
Through the middle of the twentieth century, much of the
psychiatric care received by severely mentally ill individuals took
place in hospitals. In 1955, when the total U.S. population stood

marriage. is dissolved only by (1) the death of one of the parties or (2) a decree of
annulment or dissolution of marriage by a court of competent jurisdiction.").
For simplicity of exposition, this Article's examples and terminology assume that the
divorce proceedings involve a man and woman who have been legally tied by a
marriage relation. Although we do not consider the matter in detail here, we
recognize that some states allow marriages or civil unions between two persons of
the same sex. We believe that the points made in this Article concerning competence
to divorce would apply to proceedings that terminate civil unions or marriages
involving same-sex couples.
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at 166 million,' approximately 550,000 persons were confined in
public psychiatric institutions,often termed "state hospitals."
Two decades later, this number had fallen to under 200,000, and
today, fewer than 50,000 persons are committed to state and
county psychiatric hospitals despite a near-doubling of the U.S.
population over the same period.'o
Several factors have
contributed to this decrease:
* The mid-1950s witnessed the development and first
use of psychotropic medications which stabilized many
persons who previously would have suffered from
devastating mood and thought disorders, which
allowed them to manage successfully in the
community."
* The 1963 passage of the Mental Retardation Facilities
and Community Mental Health Centers Construction
Act 1 2 signaled a growing belief that mentally disabled
persons should be provided with community services
that would allow them to receive treatment as
outpatients rather than only in hospitals. 3
* In the 1960s, Congress enacted changes in Medicare,
Medicaid, and Social Security laws that created
financial support for mentally ill persons to receive
care in community hospitals.' In the late 1960s and

* Information Please, U.S. Events, http://www.infoplease.com/year/1955.html
(last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
1o Ronald W. Manderscheid et al., Changing Trends in State Psychiatric
Hospital Use From 2002 to 2005, 60 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 29, 30-31 (2009). Table
1 states that 49,947 persons were residing in state and county hospitals in 2005. Id.
at 30. Figure 1 shows the number of residents equaled 550,000 in the mid-1950s and
was well below 200,000 by 1980. Id. at 31.
In July 2005, the U.S. population was estimated at 295,753,151. U.S. Census
Bureau, National
and State Population
Estimates, http//www.census.
gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). Thus, over the
course of fifty years, the U.S. per capita rate of public sector psychiatric
hospitalization fell nearly 95%, from 3.3 to 0.17 persons per 1,000 persons.
11 See Douglas Mossman, Unbuckling the "Chemical Straitjacket": The Legal
Significance of Recent Advances in the PharmacologicalTreatment of Psychosis, 39
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1033, 1062-65 (2002) (describing the development and impact of
the first psychotropic medications for psychoses).
12 Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282 (1963).
1 See Jeffrey L. Geller, The Last Half-Century of Psychiatric Services as
Reflected in PsychiatricServices, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 41, 47 (2000) (discussing
beliefs about the relative virtues of non-hospital treatment).
1
For example, the Social Security Amendments of 1965 added Title XIX
(Medicaid) to the Social Security Act. Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965). This Act
meant that Medicaid would fund psychiatric treatment in general hospitals for
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1970s, court decisions and legislative alterations
changed involuntary psychiatric hospitalization from a
putatively benevolent, paternalistic enterprise guided
by medical professionals' judgments about the need for
treatment to a court-controlled mechanism that
responds primarily to manifestly dangerous behavior.' 5
In the 1990s, managed care contributed forcefully to
the perception that persons should be hospitalized for
much shorter times than doctors had previously
thought wise, and also made it more likely that any
hospitalization would take place in local facilities
offering rapid treatment. 16
The combined effect of these changes in medical care-the
move to much shorter psychiatric hospitalizations, the
availability of pharmacological treatments that produce
temporary resolution of psychoses, and treatment of mentally ill
patients outside hospitals-is that most persons with conditions
that would formerly have led to lengthy hospitalization now
remain in the community despite their severe psychiatric
illnesses. They thus have more and better opportunities to do
the things other adults do, including meet others, marry, and-if
things "don't work out"-file for divorce.
2.

Legal Categorizations of Individuals with Mental Illness

We just noted that changes in commitment laws have led
to a focus on risk and danger as justifications for commitment,
indigent persons in categorical assistance programs, and it improved Medicare
coverage for psychiatric illnesses. See Mossman, supra note 11, at 1064-65
(describing the treatment of psychiatric patients before these enactments).
a For example, an express purpose of California's Lanterman-Petris-Short Act,
passed in 1969, was "to promote the legislative intent ... [t]o end the inappropriate,
indefinite, and involuntary commitment of mentally disordered persons" and "[tlo
safeguard individual rights through judicial review." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 5001(g) (2010). There are several key legal decisions of the 1970s that affected civil
commitment. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-33 (1979) (holding
that civil commitment requires proof by clear and convincing evidence);.O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (holding that a state may not "constitutionally
confine without more [justification] a nondangerous individual who" can live in
community safely with "help of willing and responsible family members or friends");
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1090 (E.D. Wisc. 1972) (entitling persons
facing involuntary civil commitment to procedural safeguards similar to those
guaranteed criminal defendants).
1 See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Geller et al., The Effects of Public Managed Care on
Patternsof Intensive Use of InpatientPsychiatricServices, 49 PSYCIATRIC SERVICES
327 (1998) (documenting shorter stays in Massachusetts).
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rather than a need for treatment. From a legal standpoint,
involuntarily hospitalization is "a massive curtailment of
liberty."" Until relatively recently, persons hospitalized because
of a mental impairment lost many of their civil rights.18 Further,
courts were likely to regard persons with mental illnesses as
simply non compos mentis, that is, globally incompetent for all
purposes, including management of financial and personal
affairs.' 9
A formal adjudication of incompetence led to
appointment of a guardian who made decisions on behalf of the
individual.20
For the last few decades, however, civil commitment statutes
have expressly preserved many or all of a person's customary
civil rights during hospitalization, including inter alia the right
to make personal decisions, including marriage.2 ' Moreover,
courts now may make competence adjudications concerning
specific incapacities-such as incompetence to make treatment
decisions or to stand trial-rather than simple plenary
adjudications about all legal capacities.2 2 A person who is
adjudicated incompetent to manage financial affairs is not
necessarily deemed incompetent to make personal decisions.2 3
Even if a person is adjudicated incompetent for several discrete
purposes, a court's order listing these purposes preserves the
respondent's rights in other areas of decisionmaking.24 Thus,
having a severe mental illness is no longer the legal barrier to
marriage it was a half-century ago.
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
See Gillis v. Cameron, 324 F.2d 419, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ("[Wlithout any
inquiry or finding as to actual competence in the given area, a patient [who was
civilly committed in Washington, D.C.] ... may apparently be deprived of the right
to vote, to drive an automobile, to enter into binding legal arrangements and to
exercise other civil rights.") (citations omitted); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE
LAW 220-23 (Frank T. Lindman & Donald M. McIntyre, Jr. eds., 1961)
(summarizing laws as they existed in 1960).
1 See Alan Meisel, Ethics and Law: Physician-AssistedDying, 8 J. PALLIATIVE
17
1

MED. 609, 613 (2005).
20 JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL
PRACTICE 96 (2d ed. 2001).
21 See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.301 (LexisNexis 2010) (protecting
employment rights and rights to contract, hold licenses, marry, divorce, make wills,
vote, sue, and be sued).
2 See Meisel, supra note 19.
1 See id. (including medical, social, marital and other types of decisions as
"personal decisions").
2 BERG ET AL., supra note 20, at 97.
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Divorce: More Common, More Acceptable
During the last third of the twentieth century, divorce
became more common and much more socially acceptable.2 5
Between 1960 and 1981, the U.S. divorce rate increased from 2.2
to 5.3 per 1,000 persons. 26 Rtsh
Res have decreased steadily since,
and in 2006, the divorce rate was 3.6 per 1,000 persons.
However, this rate is still well above the 1960 rate,2 7 and the
drop in divorce rates has been accompanied by a much lower
marriage rate. Thus, over the last half-century, the probability
that a marriage will end in divorce has doubled.28
The rapid rise in U.S. divorce rates between 1960 and 1980
was "unprecedented"" and coincided with less disapproving
social attitudes toward divorce. In 1945 and 1966, "not strict
enough" was the most popular response to public survey
questions about state divorce laws.30 Between 1968 and 1974,
however, the fraction of survey respondents who favored easier
access to divorce rose substantially, and the fraction wanting
stricter rules declined.'
These attitude changes did not cause increasing divorce
rates; rather, the attitudinal changes appear to have followed
and in some sense ratified what everyone could observe. In any
event, couples who feel distressed by their marriages are no
longer confronted by a social taboo against divorce.
3.

4.

Larger Vulnerable Population
As we explain further in Part IV, persons above age sixty
years are particularly vulnerable to new-onset mental illnesses
25For a fascinating discussion of this phenomenon, the factors contributing to it,

and its international and historical context, see WILLIAM J. GOODE, WORLD
CHANGES IN DIVORCE PATTERNS 135-82 (1993).
26 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2008
63 tbl.77 (2008), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/08abstract/
vitstat.pdf.
27 Id.
2 During the period of 1950 to 1965, the annual U.S. marriage rate ranged from
8.5 to 11.1 per 1,000, and the divorce rate ranged from 2.2 to 2.6 per 1,000. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2003 72 tbl.83
(2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/03statab/vitstat.pdf. Thus,
the ratio of marriages to divorces was around 4:1. In 1970, this ratio was 10.6:3.5
(about 3:1), and since 1976, the ratio has consistently hovered around 2:1. Id.
29 ANDREw J. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 46 (1981).
30 See id. at 45-46.
* See id. at 46-49.
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that can generate paranoia without causing more global
psychiatric impairment-the clinical constellation that Mr. Doe's

case exemplifies. Over the past half-century, the fraction of the
U.S. population age sixty years and older has grown enormously.
In 1950, average life expectancy was 65.6 years for men and 71.1
years for women; by 1980, life expectancy had risen to 77.4 years
for women and 70.0 years for men; in 2006, U.S. life expectancy
was 77.7 years overall-80.2 years for women and 75.1 years for
men.3 2 These increases have resulted in a much larger aging
population currently living in the U.S.. Between 1950 and 2006,
the U.S. population roughly doubled, but the population over age
sixty-five years tripled." By 2030-when all the "baby boomers"
will have reached age sixty-five years-the population age sixtyfive to seventy-four years will have grown from six percent to ten
percent of the total U.S. population. 34 The susceptibility of
elderly persons to mental problems is demonstrated by the
finding that, in 2007, approximately four million persons aged
sixty-five and over suffered from some type of mental disability.3
5.

Comment
Social changes may have created a larger population of
individuals who might seek divorce and who are susceptible to
the kinds of mental impairments that severely distort thinking
about one's spouse while leaving other aspects of functioning
intact. However, a key factor enabling persons to divorce for
delusional reasons 36 has been the advent of more liberal grounds

32 Mel0nie Heron et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2006, in 57 NAT'L

CTR. FOR

HEALTH STATISTICS, NATIONAL VITAL STATISTIC REPORTS 27 (2009).
3 NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2008, at 20
(2009) [hereinafter NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS]; see also U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, THE 2010 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: OVERVIEW 34 (2009) [hereinafter U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU].
4 NATL CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, supra note 33.
5 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 33, at tbl.35. Note that these numbers
exclude the populations housed in institutions and only account for persons within
the household population. Id.
' That is, reasons based on delusions. Here and throughout, the words
"delusion" or "delusional" refer to an idea that is
[al false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is
firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite
what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the
contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the
person's culture or subculture (e.g., it is not an article of religious faith).
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for divorce and the removal of requirements to prove a legally
recognized justification for a divorce. To understand this, we
review "traditional" grounds for divorce that existed prior to
1969, underscoring the need for credible proof that these grounds
required.
B.

"Traditional"Grounds for Divorce

Although the advent of "no-fault" grounds altered divorce
law substantially during the last third of the twentieth century,
most states have preserved at least some of the traditional faultbased grounds for divorce that previously existed." Fault-based
grounds have always been regulated by the state legislatures."
Statutes typically have included adultery, abandonment or
desertion, and cruelty or inhuman treatment as fault-based
grounds for divorce;39 other fault-based grounds available in some
states include insanity, conviction of a crime, habitual
drunkenness, and drug addiction.4 0
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
DISORDERS 821 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].

MANUAL

OF MENTAL

An additional feature of Mr. Doe's clinical presentation is his lack of insight with
regard to the delusions. That is, Mr. Doe is unaware that he is ill and that he is
experiencing symptoms-here, delusional ideas-of his illness. In many patients
with severe mental disorders, "[tihe rational faculty ... although they are often
quite capable in other arenas, seems to stop short at the line where their diagnosis is
made." S. NASSIR GHAEMI, THE CONCEPTS OF PSYCHIATRY: A PLURALISTIC
APPROACH TO THE MIND AND MENTAL ILLNESS 231 (2003). The relationship between

delusions and lack of insight is complex, and the two phenomena are not
coterminous. Nonetheless, studies suggest that approximately two-thirds of patients
with schizophrenia and manic-depressive (bipolar) illness have some impairment in
their capacity for insight. Id. at 232.
" See 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 27 (2009) (citing S.B. v. S.J.B. 609 A.2d 124 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992)); Restifo v. Restifo, 489 A.2d 196, 198-99 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1985) (stating that adultery, cruelty, and desertion are traditional fault grounds for
divorce).
' "Divorce is a creature of statute and can only be granted when statutory
grounds have been proved and corroborated." Pomraning v. Pomraning, 682 S.W.2d
775, 776 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985). "It is not within the power of the parties to terminate
[a marriage] at pleasure, or for any cause. Its dissolution can only be declared by a
court of competent jurisdiction, for some specified cause prescribed by law . . .."
Adams v. Adams, 25 Minn. 72, 77-78 (1878).
* See Peter Nash Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 31
FAM. L.Q. 269, 270 (1997).
40 There are various broad fault categories, including: voluntary separation, 24
AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation§§ 25-33 (2009), cruelty, id. §§ 34-55, adultery,
id. H#56-57, desertion, id. §§ 58-60, conviction of crime, id. §§ 81-82, habitual
drunkeness or drug addiction, id. §§ 83-86, nonsupport, id. §§ 87-88, and
indignities, id. §§ 89-94.
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Obtaining a divorce on fault-based grounds requires
statutorily specified levels of proof and corroboration. 4 1 When the
marriage is of long duration, substantial evidence may be
required to dissolve it. The following paragraphs summarize the
types of evidence required to support fault-based divorce actions.
1.

Cruel and Inhuman Treatment
Proof of cruel and inhuman treatment typically requires
"'something more than unkindness or rudeness or mere
incompatibility or want of affection,' "42 isolated acts of
mistreatment, or a single physical assault.4 3 Showing that the
marriage is acrimonious or strained usually is not sufficient" if
the alleged cruel and inhuman treatment has a causal relation to
the separation request.4 5
To dissolve long-term marriages on grounds of cruel and
inhuman treatment, trial courts generally must find that the
accused party's actions would endanger the physical or mental
well-being of the spouse seeking divorce 46 and must hear
testimony from the accusing spouse that the defendant's
41

"[A] marriage should not be lightly terminated. A plaintiff is required to prove

a statutory cause for divorce by competent evidence. . . ." Lowrance v. Lowrance,

335 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975). The court must also find corroboration of
claims and "[clorroborating testimony may not consist of mere generalities or
opinions, beliefs and conclusions on the part of the witness but must be directed
toward specific language, acts and conduct." Pomraning, 682 S.W.2d at 777.
Traditionally, admissions or confessions alone are insufficient, and proof
traditionally requires at least a preponderance of evidence. 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce
and Separation§ 321 (2009).
42 Smith v. Smith, 614 So. 2d 394, 396 (Miss. 1993) (quoting Wires v. Wires, 297
So. 2d 900, 902 (Miss. 1974)); see also Steen v. Steen, 641 So. 2d 1167, 1170 (Miss.
1994).
4 See Palin v. Palin, 213 A.D.2d 707, 707-08, 624 N.Y.S.2d 630, 632 (2d Dep't
1995). But see McKee v. Flynt, 630 So. 2d 44, 48 (Miss. 1993) (one incident may be so
violent and of sufficient gravity to establish grounds); Rojek v. Rojek, 234 A.D.2d
1011, 1011, 651 N.Y.S.2d 813, 813-14 (4th Dep't 1996) (one severe beating or other
violent episode may suffice to prove "cruel and inhuman treatment").
" See, e.g., Walczak v. Walczak, 206 A.D.2d 900, 900, 614 N.Y.S.2d 835, 835-36
(4th Dep't 1994) (finding that, despite limited communication, sleeping in separate
bedrooms, and some arguments, these strained relations were insufficient to end a
twenty-five year marriage parties because they talked to each other in a civilized
manner and committed no physical violence).
4 See, e.g., Morris v. Morris, 804 So. 2d 1025, 1031 (Miss. 2002) (finding that
when the wife was the only person who testified that husband acted in a cruel and
inhuman manner, the husband's conduct was not cruel and inhuman treatment).
4 See Brady v. Brady, 64 N.Y.2d 339, 343, 476 N.E.2d 290, 292, 486 N.Y.S.2d
891, 893 (1985).
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calculated cruelty renders cohabitation inappropriate.4 7 Courts
have recognized, however, that even without physical displays of
violence, atrocious conduct alone may constitute cruelty4 8 and
"may more perniciously affect health and life than bodily
bruises."4' Requirements concerning the types, precise duration,
and number of acts of cruelty differ from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. Cruelty claims have been sustained when evidence
established a substantial risk of violence or harm,so conduct that
threatens to impair health," substance abuse,52 deviant sexual
behavior,5 3 threats of violence,5 4 cursing, hollering, throwing
things, and mean behavior toward the other spouse and
children.'5
Notwithstanding any formal evidentiary requirements,
cruelty was the most popular ground for a fault-based divorce by
the mid-twentieth century.56 Thus, appellate decisions on what

7 See Feeny v. Feeny, 241 A.D.2d 510, 510, 661 N.Y.S.2d 26, 26 (2d Dep't 1997).
* See Krauss v. Krauss, 111 So. 683, 685 (La. 1927).
* See Tschida v. Tschida, 212 N.W. 193, 194 (Minn. 1927).
50 See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 704 S.W.2d 528, 529-30 (Tex. App. 1986)
(discussing what constitutes a reasonable apprehension of violence or conduct that
impairs or threatens another's health permanently).
s1 See, e.g., Rheinheimer v. Rheinheimer, 235 A.D.2d 742, 742, 652 N.Y.S.2d
410, 411 (3d Dep't 1997) (discussing verbal and physical abuse that made
cohabitation unsafe).
52 See Routhier v. Routhier, 514 A.2d 825, 826 (N.H.
1986) (holding that
excessive drinking formed part of claim's substantiation).
" See Cherry v. Cherry, 593 So. 2d 13 (Miss. 1991) (noting that the husband's
impotence and cross-dressing could constitute cruel and inhuman treatment).
* See, e.g., McKee v. Flynt, 630 So. 2d 44, 48-49 (Miss. 1993) (finding that the
risk of life, limb, or health must be real, rather than imaginary); Stoothoff v.
Stoothoff, 226 A.D.2d 209, 210, 640 N.Y.S.2d 553, 553 (1st Dep't 1996) (holding that
a pattern of threatening violent acts met the standard of proof for divorce).
55 See Eppling v. Eppling, 537 So. 2d 814, 817 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (regarding
cursing and similar behavior as proof); Smith v. Smith, 206 A.D.2d 255, 255, 613
N.Y.S.2d 866, 866-67 (1st Dep't 1994) (holding that constant denigration met
standard); Moro v. Moro, 589 N.E.2d 416, 419 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (finding tht
refusing to speak to one's spouse for periods of time met standard).
' The adaptability of cruelty to various fact patterns made it "the dazzling
success story of family law." Lawrence M. Friedman & Robert V. Percival, Who Sues
for Divorce? From Fault Through Fiction to Freedom, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 61, 79-80
(1976). One-eighth of all divorces in the 1860s were based on cruelty; by 1950,
cruelty had become the stated ground for more than half of divorces. J. HERBIE
DIFONZo, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE, 53-54 tbl.3 (1997). In 1937, a Time magazine
article noted that cruelty was easier to prove than other grounds; also, many couples
in adulterous relationships asserted cruelty to avoid having to admit adultery. Id. at

54-55.
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constitutes cruelty may not fully reflect the laxity with which
trial courts applied evidentiary requirements in most cases heard
prior to the advent of no-fault divorce options.
2.

Adultery
Because adultery" is often committed in private, eyewitness
testimony is not needed to corroborate a claim. But the evidence
submitted must create more than a "mere suspicion" of guilt;
"proof must be sufficiently definite to identify the time and place
of the offense and the circumstances under which it was
committed."5 8 When circumstantial evidence is used, the burden
of proof may be similar to, though not as high as, the proof of
guilt required for criminal conviction.59 An accused party's
admission may be evaluated under a clear preponderance
standard and should be supported by independent proof
establishing when, where, and under what circumstances the
adulterous act occurred. 0 Overcoming the presumption of
innocence takes more than showing that the accused party had
the opportunity to commit adultery."' Additional matters to be
considered include the parties' inclinations, the amount of time
they spent together, whether their relationship was open,
surreptitious, or openly amorous, and whether others were
present when the alleged adultery occurred.6 2

" "Voluntary sexual

intercourse between a married person and a partner other

than the lawful spouse." WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 80

(1988).
* Loftis v. Loftis, 325 S.E.2d 73, 74 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985).
*' See, e.g., Billington v. Billington, 531 So. 2d 924, 924 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988)
stating that circumstantial evidence proving adultery must be "such as would lead
the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just man to conclude that the act of
adultery has been committed"); accord Rowe v. Rowe, 575 So. 2d 584, 587 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1991); Sibley v. Sibley, 693 So. 2d 1270, 1271 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that
circumstantial proof "must be so convincing that it establishes" adultery by "the
party accused to the exclusion of any other reasonable hypothesis").
6o See Nemeth v. Nemeth, 481 S.E.2d 181, 181 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997); Brown v.
Brown, 56 S.E.2d 330, 335 (S.C. Ct. App. 1949).
61 Circumstantial evidence, however, showing the opportunity and inclination to
commit adultery establishes a prima facie case. See Panhorst v. Panhorst, 390
S.E.2d 376, 377 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
62 See Sibley, 693 So. 2d at 1271.
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3.

Desertion or Abandonment
Proof of desertion or abandonment involves showing that one
spouse has resolved not to live with the other13-for example,
that one spouse has left the state without saying when he will
return, or has made an unjustified or nonconsensual departure
from the home."4 A plaintiff may also demonstrate desertion or
abandonment by showing that the accused party has ceased
sexual relations without explanation or reason and has neglected
"marital duties"-laundry, cleaning, and cooking--even though
the couple continue to reside together. 5 Single instances of
denying sexual relations or neglecting marital duties, however,
do not constitute abandonment, and if an accused party's action
appears justifiable, a trial court usually will not grant a divorce
on grounds of abandonment.66 States that permit divorce on
grounds of desertion usually require that the desertion or
abandonment has occurred for a specified period.6 7
Mental Incapacity or Insanity8
Though mental incapacity or "insanity" is an independent
ground for divorce in some jurisdictions, in others, mental
4.

6 See, e.g., Hage v. Hage, 112 A.D.2d 659, 661, 492 N.Y.S.2d 172, 175 (3d Dep't
1985) (demanding that the "evidence must show a 'hardening of resolve' by one
spouse not to live with the other").
6 See id; see, e.g., Sanchez v. Sanchez, 490 So. 2d 434, 437 (La. Ct. App. 1986)
(stating that mere friction, dissatisfaction, or incompatibility is not enough to justify
a withdrawal from the common dwelling); Sprott v. Sprott, 355 S.E.2d 881, 883 (Va.
1987) (stating that the gradual breakdown in the marital relationship does not
legally justify one spouse leaving the other).
6 See Jamison v. Jamison, 352 S.E.2d 719, 721 (Va. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting
Chandler v. Chandler, 112 S.E. 856, 860-61 (Va. 1922)).
6 See Caprise v. Caprise, 143 A.D.2d 968, 970, 533 N.Y.S.2d 622, 624 (2d Dep't
1988) (finding that the single refusal of sex was insufficient, and that the accusing
party should submit evidence of repeated requests).
6 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.050(4) (2010) (one year); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 32-609 (2010) (one year); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(2) (McKinney 2010) (one year).
6 We note that a suit for divorce predicated on the respondent's mental illness
presents the opposite circumstance of this Article's main subject.
6 In 1949, twenty-six states and territories allowed divorce on grounds of
mental illness. See Dribin v. Superior Court, 231 P.2d 809, 813 (Cal. 1951). The
following are examples of currently valid statutes. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-15-2-3(4)
(LexisNexis 2009) (stating that grounds for a dissolution decree include "[ilncurable
insanity of either party for a period of at least two (2) years"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 505.1 (2009) (permitting divorce to be granted if couple have lived apart for three
consecutive years without cohabitation because of one spouse's "incurable insanity,"
and specifying the requirements to demonstrate incurability).
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incapacity precludes a suit for divorce against the mentally
incapacitated respondent on other statutory grounds." However,
in some states where insanity is not an independent ground for
divorce, a divorce on other grounds may be commenced against a
mentally ill person where certain requirements are met.'
Generally, divorce will not be granted because of insanity unless
the statute specifically provides for divorce on this ground. 7 2 In
some older cases, insanity could be a defense to a divorce action if
the behavior of the accused emanated from an illness so severe
that it would satisfy the insanity test as applied to alleged
criminal acts."
Proving insanity for purposes of divorce typically requires
that the respondent suffer from a very severe form of mental
illness that meets specific statutory criteria.74 For example, the
Idaho statute permits divorce on grounds of "permanent
insanity" only if the mentally ill person has been "confined in an
insane asylum" for three years prior to commencement of the
divorce action and it appears "that such insanity is permanent
and incurable."" Statutes have often been strictly scrutinized by
courts and may be strictly construed.76
7o A. Della Porta, Annotation, Requisites of Proof of Insanity as a Ground
for
Divorce, 15 A.L.R.2d 1135, § 1 (2009) (observing that insanity of one spouse
precludes divorce sought by the other spouse on other grounds because divorce
should be grounded on fault, not misfortune).
n1See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1505(b)(3) (2010) (permitting divorce upon
showing of separation caused by respondent's mental illness). In some states,
however, insanity of a respondent may imply that he could not consent or acquiesce
to a separation. See Cox v. Cox, 109 So. 2d 703, 705 (Ala. 1959) (finding that "[ain
insane person cannot be said to have or maintain ... an intention" to abandon a
spouse).
72 See Dribin,231 P.2d at 813.
7
Insanity is a defense to an action for a divorce on the ground of cruel and
inhuman treatment, if, at the time the alleged acts of cruelty were committed, the
defendant was laboring under such a defect of reason as not to know the nature of
his or her acts or that they were wrong. Dankers v. Dankers, 172 N.W.2d 318, 320
(Minn. 1969) (quoting Longbotham v. Longbotham, 137 N.W. 387, 389 (Minn. 1912));
see also Kunz v. Kunz, 213 N.W. 906, 907 (Minn. 1927) (noting that this test "is the
statutory one for mental responsibility for criminal acts").
7 See Porta,supra note 70.
7 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-801 (2010); see also ALA. CODE § 30-2-1(a)(8) (1975)
(allowing divorce from spouse after hospitalization for at least five successive years
if the spouse is "hopelessly and incurably insane"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12301(b)(6)(A) (2009) (allowing divorce from spouse who has been hospitalized for at
least three years); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-40(c)(10) (2009) (allowing divorce
after confinement based on mental illness totaled a period of five years within six
years of filing); FLA. STAT. § 61.052(1)(b) (2010) (allowing dissolution following three

HeinOnline -- 84 St. John's L. Rev. 133 2010

134

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:117

Conviction of a Crime
Conviction of a felony or imprisonment for a determined
period of time constitutes grounds for divorce in some states.7 1 If
a state lacks a statute specifically delineating conviction or
imprisonment as a ground for divorce, however, relief may not be
granted based on these circumstances.
If a statute provides
only for divorce against an imprisoned spouse, an imprisoned
spouse may not seek divorce from the other spouse on grounds of
his own imprisonment.
It may not be necessary that the
convicted spouse be serving a sentence.o Many statutes do not
create a distinction between state or federal and civil or military
convictions, and offer the right to divorce on this ground in all
cases."' It is not necessary, under some statutes, to wait until all
5.

consecutive years of incapacitation); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-5-3(11) (2010) (citing
"incurable mental illness" as a ground for total divorce and requiring
institutionalization for at least two years before divorce proceedings); Glisson v.
Glisson, 237 A.2d 393, 395 (Del. 1967) (interpreting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13
§ 1522(10) to require five years of institutionalization in addition to adjudication of
insanity).
76 [Flor humanitarian reasons, [the statutes making postnuptial insanity
ground for divorce seem] to have been subjected to a strict construction. . . ." C. C.
Marvel, Annotation, Insanity as Substantive Ground of Divorce or Separation, 24
A.L.R.2d 873, § 6 (2009); see, e.g., Finkelstein v. Finkelstein, 198 P.2d 98, 99 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1948) (refusing to grant a divorce because the wife had been released
from the hospital at various intervals and had lived with her mother, precluding her
from meeting the statutory requirement of a three-year hospitalization). Other
states do not require specific time periods of institutionalization or evidence of
hospitalization, but only a showing of "incurable insanity" at the time of the divorce
complaint. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 2312 (West 2010) (requiring no duration of
institutionalization, but only evidence of incurable insanity continuing from the time
of filing for divorce).
77 See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 103(3) (2007) (permitting divorce if the
"other spouse has committed a felony and has been sentenced to death or
imprisonment at hard labor").
78 See Sitterson v. Sitterson, 131 S.E. 641, 643 (N.C. 1926) ("To hold that a
separation brought about by imprisonment .. . would constitute a cause of action for
absolute divorce would in effect constitute a judicial enactment of a new ground for
divorce in North Carolina.").
I See Anderson v. Anderson, 300 A.2d 186, 186 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1973)
(exemplifying a statute that provides for divorce against,not by, imprisoned spouse).
' See Tauzier v. Tauzier, 466 So. 2d 565, 567 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that
divorce may be granted because of a spouse's felony conviction even if conviction is
on appeal or the sentence is suspended).
8 See Clark v. Clark, 54 A.2d 166, 167 (N.H. 1947).
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delays for appeal have expired to seek divorce based on a
spouse's criminal conviction."
A sentence does not end a
marriage automatically, but will require legal action."
6.

Habitual Intoxication or Substance Dependence
Currently, around half of U.S. jurisdictions allow for divorce
based on "habitual intemperance"" or substance dependence ,
more commonly called "addiction."" Generally, to grant a divorce
based on the respondent's habitual intoxication, a court must
hear testimony showing that the episodes of intoxication occurred
frequently-more than two or three times." A Louisiana appeals
court sustained a divorce based on habitual intoxication where
the respondent consumed several beers every night and
underwent a violent personality change when drunk.87 However,
in a case in which the respondent drank frequently but had a
doctor and psychologist testify that he showed no signs of alcohol
or substance abuse, an appeals court concluded that the trial
judge had erred in finding habitual intemperance.
C.

"No-Fault"Divorce

In 1970, California enacted the U.S.'s first "no-fault" divorce
statute.8 ' By 1987, all states effectively had laws that allowed a
couple to obtain a divorce without ascribing fault to one party. 90
See Nickels v. Nickels, 347 So. 2d 510, 510 (La. Ct. App. 1977).
* See Ferrin v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 71 N.Y.2d 42, 46, 517 N.E.2d
1370, 1372, 523 N.Y.S.2d 485, 487 (1987).
84 Defined as "Itihat degree of intemperance from the use of intoxicating liquor
which disqualifies the person a great portion of the time from properly attending to
business, or which would reasonably inflict a course of great mental anguish upon
the innocent party. Habitual or excessive use of liquor." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
727 (5th ed. 1979).
8 LYNN D. WARDLE & LAURENCE C. NOLAN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF
FAMILY LAW 647 (2d ed. 2006).
6 See Braswell v. Braswell, 494 So. 2d 1333, 1336 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
87 See Smith v. Smith, 528 So. 2d 1055, 1056-57 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
" See Blanchard v. Blanchard, 490 So. 2d 361, 364 (La. Ct. App. 1986). The trial
court's judgment was affirmed, however, because evidence sustained a conclusion of
cruelty. Id. at 364-65.
89 Denese Ashbaugh Vlosky & Pamela A. Monroe, The Effective Dates of NoFault Divorce Laws in the 50 States, 51 FAM. REL. 317, 320 tbl.1 (2002); Ted Gest,
Divorce; How the Game Is Played Now, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 21, 1983, at
39.
" Vlosky & Monroe, supra note 89; Gest, supra note 89 (noting that no-fault
divorce was available in every state except South Dakota in 1983). Vlosky and
Monroe make the interesting point that states took a variety of courses to effect no82
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Though no-fault options are available to couples throughout
the U.S., some states make obtaining a no-fault divorce more
difficult than others. Strictly speaking, New York state does not
have a no-fault law.91 Residents may divorce through conversion
of a separation judgment 92 or through a mutually acknowledged
separation agreement after living apart for a year or more. In
Illinois, a couple may obtain a no-fault marital dissolution only if
the court finds that they have lived apart for two years,
"irreconcilable differences have caused the irretrievable
breakdown of the marriage and ... efforts at reconciliation have
failed or .. . would be impracticable and not in the best interests
of the family."9 4 By contrast, California requires only that
"[i]rreconcilable differences ... have caused the irremediable
breakdown of the marriage," where such differences need only
"be substantial reasons for not continuing the marriage and
which make it appear that the marriage should be dissolved."9 '
Though scholars debate the reasons why, no-fault divorce
arrived at a period in U.S. history when divorce rates were
Some researchers suggest that the
already increasing.9"
availability of no-fault divorce accelerated this trend.97 Others
believe that no-fault statutes were largely redundant." Even
before no-fault laws were enacted, many judges were using fault
fault options for consensual divorce. For reasons of efficiency or political expedience,
"[s]ome states eased their divorce laws ... by ... decreas[ing] the period of
separation required before a divorce could be granted, in some cases to as little as 6
months." Vlosky & Monroe, supra note 89, at 317. The details of these changes
appear in their Table 2. Id. at 322-23 tbl.2 (demonstrating, for example, that New
York is a separation only state and a divorce can be obtained after one year of
separation).
9 Vlosky & Monroe, supra note 89, at 319 (recognizing that some authors do not
classify New York's separation provision as "no-fault").
9 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170.5 (McKinney 2010).

* Id. § 170.6.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN 5/401(a)(2) (West 2009).
CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 2310-2311 (West 2010).
96 See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (discussing marriage and
divorce rates).
97 See, e.g., Thomas B. Marvell, Divorce Rates and the Fault Requirement, 23
LAw & Soc'y REV. 543, 544, 563 (1989) (finding that "on the average, the no-fault
laws increased divorces by some twenty to twenty-five percent"); Joseph L. Rodgers
et al., Did No-FaultDivorce LegislationMatter? Definitely Yes and Sometimes No, 61
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 803, 804 (1999) (noting that, in states that implemented nofault divorce between 1965 and 1974, "a substantial number of divorces [took place]
that would not have occurred otherwise").
" See Marvell, supra note 97, at 544.
9
9
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grounds-such as cruelty"-as "de facto no-fault grounds" for
anyone "who wanted to divorce and who was willing to pay the
social and economic costs."100
D.

UnilateralDivorce

During the 1970s and 1980s, most legislatures passed laws
that allowed one spouse to unilaterally petition for and obtain a
divorce. 01 In some jurisdictions, these laws let one spouse
initiate and obtain a divorce upon showing that the couple have
lived apart for a certain time period.102 In other states, no time
period is necessary.103
Economic analyses suggest that unilateral divorce statutesrather than no-fault laws-bear responsibility for the increased
likelihood of divorce observed in the U.S. during the last third of
the twentieth century.'0 4 The basic thesis behind these studies is
that, in combination with other legal changes that affected
property distribution, unilateral divorce laws altered the
economic incentives to stay married as well as the bargaining
positions of spouses. 05
Initial work using this perspective
applied a "contract-theoretic framework" to marital bargaining
structures under the assumption of symmetric information, and
" See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
100 Norval D. Glenn, Further Discussion of the Effects of No-Fault Divorce on
Divorce Rates, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 800, 802 (1999); see also Ira Mark Ellman,
Divorce Rates, Marriage Rates, and the Problematic Persistence of Traditional
MaritalRoles, 34 FAM. L.Q. 1, 3 (2000) (noting that "the divorce rate began climbing
long before no-fault divorce was adopted, and that no durable acceleration in the
rate of increase followed its adoption").
101See Jonathan Gruber, Is Making Divorce Easier Bad for Children? The LongRun Implications of UnilateralDivorce, 22 J. LAB. ECON. 799, 803 tbl.1 (2004) (table
showing dates of no-fault and unilateral divorce legislation). Before 1970, six states
permitted unilateral divorce and by 1987, thirty-four states did. See id. For a table
displaying various types of unilateral laws and the role of fault in determining
settlement, see Leora Friedberg, Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates?
Evidence from Panel Data, 88 AMER. ECON. REV. 608, 612-13 tbl.1 (1998).
102See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.01(J) (LexisNexis 2010) (permitting
courts to grant divorce "[oln the application of either party, when husband and wife
have, without interruption for one year, lived separate and apart without
cohabitation").
103 Thus, California's divorce law is both a no-fault and a unilateral divorce
statute without a separation requirement. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 2310-2311 (West
2010).
10 See Kristie M. Engemann & Michael T. Owyang, Splitsville: The Economics
of UnilateralDivorce, REGIONAL ECON., Jan. 2008, at 12, 16.
105 See id.
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concluded that unilateral divorce laws had not affected divorce
rates.10 6
Subsequent work in the 1990s reached different
conclusions, with some of the discrepancies accounted for by
disagreements about what constitutes a "unilateral" divorce
law, 1 7 and some explained by differences in statistical models. 0 8
Leora Friedberg concludes that wide adoption of unilateral
divorce laws "accounted for 17% of the increase in divorce rates
between 1968 and 1988. . . and that the effect of unilateral

divorce on divorce behavior was permanent, not temporary."109
Some recent economic scholarship has disagreed, suggesting that
unilateral divorce laws raised divorce rates about eight years
after their adoption but that thereafter, the impact of these laws
was minimal.110

E.

Comment

Given the trends in U.S. divorce rates that were taking
place before 1970, it is difficult to know whether the changes in
divorce laws that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s have much
statistical impact on the current likelihood of divorce in the
What is clear, however, is that the
twenty-first century.
widespread availability of unilateral and unilateral/no-fault
divorce makes it far easier for individuals to maintain divorce
actions for irrational reasons and-particularly if they can
successfully separate and live independently from their
spouses-to obtain a divorce.

To be able to initiate a divorce action, a delusional litigant
like Mr. Doe would need to retain the cognitive and behavioral
competencies that permit independent living and coherent
articulation of his wishes, despite having a mental illness that
generated irrational beliefs about his spouse. Whether courts

106H. Elizabeth Peters, Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and
Private Contracting, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 437, 452 (1986) (noting, however, that
settlements were lower in unilateral states).
107 See Douglas W. Allen, Commentary, Marriage and Divorce, 82 AM. ECON.
REV. 679, 679, 683 (1992) (commenting on an article by H. Elizabeth Peters, supra
note 106).
108 See Friedberg, supra note 101, at 608 (presenting an analysis of time-series
data, state- and year-specific fixed effects models, and linear and quadratic time
trends).
In Id.
no See Justin Wolfers, Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A
Reconciliationand New Results, 96 AM. ECON. REv. 1802, 1802, 1813 (2006).
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should allow persons with focal but serious mental impairments
and delusional motivations to divorce is a matter that we address
in later Parts of this Article. In the next Part, we provide short
descriptions of mental illnesses that answer the question, "What
might be wrong with Mr. Doe?""'
III. PSYCHIATRIC CONDITIONS THAT MIGHT PRODUCE
INCOMPETENCE TO DIVORCE

Many individuals suffer from mental disorders.1 1 2 Though
these conditions by definition cause dysfunction or discomfort," 3
relatively few affected persons experience alteration in judgment
severe enough to be incompetent in any legal sphere. Moreover,
research suggests that even among those persons who have
mental disorders that might potentially impair competence, in
only a minority of cases is competence actually impaired." 4 From
the standpoint of psychiatric diagnosis, this Article focuses on a
minority within that minority: individuals whose mental
conditions deprive them of mental competence to initiate a
divorce without incapacitating them in other aspects of their
lives.
In other words, psychiatric conditions that could
conceivably create specific incompetence to maintain a divorce
action must leave their sufferers ineligible for civil commitment,
I In medical jargon, we are presenting a "differential diagnosis" of Mr. Doe.
Psychiatrist Michael First and co-authors describe the process of generating a
differential diagnosis thus: "Confronted with one (or a couple) of specific symptoms,
it is our job to cull from the wide universe of [psychiatric] conditions those that could
possibly account for them." MICHAEL B. FIRST ET AL., DSM-IV-TR HANDBOOK OF
DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS xiii (2002).
112 According to one authoritative recent estimate, 26.2% of American adults
suffer from a mental disorder in any given year, and 6% have a serious mental
illness. Ronald C. Kessler et al., Prevalence, Severity, and Comorbidity of TwelveMonth DSM-IV Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication, 62
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 617, 619 (2005).

nI Psychiatrists define a mental disorder as "a clinically significant behavioral
or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is
associated with present distress[;] ... disability[;] . . . increased risk of suffering

death, pain, disability[;] or an important loss of freedom." DSM-IV-TR, supra note
36, at xxxi. In the U.S. and Canada, neuropsychiatric disorders are the leading cause
of disability among persons aged 15-59 years. WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE WORLD
HEALTH REPORT 2004: CHANGING HISTORY 128-29 tbl.3 (2004).
114 See, e.g., Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment
Competence Study. III: Abilities of Patients To Consent to Psychiatric and Medical
Treatments, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 149, 149 (1995) (finding significant impairments
in decisional abilities in only a minority of persons with depression or
schizophrenia).
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able to care for themselves, and capable of managing day-to-day
finances well enough to avoid harm. Candidate diagnoses also
would have to leave individuals mentally intact enough to
communicate with attorneys who might take their cases after
accepting as factually based the stated explanations for wanting
to divorce. At the very least, a mental illness could not be so
severe as to render a petitioner unable to pursue a divorce pro
se.115
In this Part, we describe four psychiatric illnesses that could
produce symptoms that might induce sufferers to seek a divorce,
leave their communication and day-to-day functioning relatively
unimpaired, yet create specific impairments in judgment and
perception that, in our view, should make them ineligible to
maintain divorce actions. Other psychiatric conditions might,
under the right combination of circumstances, produce similar
gaps in an individual's functioning. However, the conditions we
describe are those most likely to produce specific thoughts and
perceptions that would impair competence to divorce while
sparing most mental faculties.
A.

Incipient Dementia

The term "dementias" refers to a group of neurological
disorders that cause a loss of various intellectual functions,
especially memory. Although dementias can occur at any age,
they typically are disorders that affect the elderly. The best
known of these conditions-"dementia of the Alzheimer's type,"
more commonly termed "Alzheimer's disease"-afflicts roughly
1.5% of persons in their late sixties; in persons over age eightyfive years, the incidence is 20% or more.16 Many other diseases
and degenerative processes can lead to dementia, however.

us All kinds of resources are available to help a delusional litigant who could not
convince an attorney to take his or her case to file for a divorce pro se. On February
3, 2010, a Google search using the phrase "pro se divorce" (including the quote
marks) turned up 14,200 hits offering help and information, including websites
sponsored by government organizations in Wisconsin, httpJ/www.wicourts.gov/
services/publicprose.htm
(last visited Apr. 15, 2010), North Carolina,
(last
http://www.nccourts.org/County/Durham/Courts/Family/ProseDivorce.asp
visited Apr. 15, 2010), Texas, httpi/www.co.travis.tx.us/recordscommunication/
law_1ibrary/ref attorney.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2010), and Wyoming,
http/www.courts.state.wy.us/DandCS.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
116

DSM-IV-TR, supra note 36, at 152.
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Alzheimer's disease is one of the "primary dementias,"" that is,
a dementia that results from deterioration of or damage to brain
cells that is not attributable to some other external cause.
Dementia may also follow repeated small blood vessel occlusion
in the brain,' exposure to chemicals,"' infectious diseases, 20
structural brain damage, 2 1 metabolic abnormalities,12 2 and other
neurological diseases. 23

117 Other primary
dementias besides Alzheimer's disease are frontal lobe
dementia, Pick's disease, and Lewy body dementia. See generally National Institutes
of Health, National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke,
http//www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/disorderindex.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
As the name implies, frontal lobe dementia is an often-genetic disease affecting a
brain's front portions. See id. Pick's disease is accompanied by progressive
deterioration of social skills, language, memory, personality, and sometimes moral
judgment. See id. Lewy bodies, which are accumulations of alpha-synuclein protein
inside neuronal nuclei in those parts of the brain that control certain aspects of
memory and movement, are present in Alzheimer's and Parkinson's diseases. See id.
Scientists think Lewy bodies may be related to, or are a variant form of Alzheimer's
or Parkinson's disease, or that they may simply co-occur. See David Weisman & Ian
McKeith, Dementia with Lewy Bodies, 27 SEMINARS IN NEUROLOGY 42, 43 (2007)
(discussing neuropathological findings).
1nl This syndrome is often called multi-infarct dementia or vascular dementia,
and results from multiple blockages of small blood vessels in the brain, often caused
by clots. In general, an "infarct" is an area of dead organ tissue caused by a loss of
circulation to the affected portion of the organ. The infarcted areas are relatively
small, are distributed in various areas of the brain, and do not individually cause the
gross, abrupt losses of specific functioning-for example, the ability to speakobserved in "strokes." Rather, their cumulative impact is to cause deterioration in
cognitive functions,. such as memory, that involve coordinated activity across
multiple brain regions. For a recent review, see Kurt A. Jellinger, The Pathology of
"Vascular Dementia": A Critical Update, 14 J. ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE 107, 107, 112,
115 (2008).
" Such chemicals include alcohol, inhaled organic compounds-such as toluene,
found in airplane glue-and heavy metals such as arsenic. Linda Chuang, Mental
DisordersSecondary to General Medical Conditions, http://emedicine.medscape.com/
article/294131-overview (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
120 A variety of infectious agents may cause dementia, including viruses (such as
HIV), bacteria (syphilis, Lyme disease), and prions (the agents that cause
Creutzfeldt-Jakob or "mad cow" disease). Osvaldo P. Almeida & Nicola T.
Lautenschlager, Dementia Associated with Infectious Diseases, 17 INT'L
PSYCHOGERIATRICS S65, S65 (2005).
121 Causes may include traumatic injury, intracranial accumulations of spinal
fluid (hydrocephalus) or blood (such as subdural hematoma), or benign or malignant
tumors. MARC E. AGRONIN, ALZHEIMER DISEASE AND OTHER DEMENTIAS 168 (2d ed.

2008).
'2
For example, deficiencies of thyroid hormone, id. at 57, or B vitamins
(including thiamine, niacin, and cyanocobalamin), id. at 183-85.
1" For example, Huntington's and Parkinson's diseases. Id. at 4.
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Under current psychiatric diagnostic criteria, a diagnosis of
dementia, whatever its source,124 requires a significant
impairment in ability to remember either new information or
information previously learned, coupled with at least one of the
following problems:
* Impaired language ability 25
* Impaired ability to carry out intentional movements126
* Loss of ability to recognize or identify objects1 27
* Disturbances in abstract thinking, planning, or
organization of activitieS128
More significant, for our purposes, are the changes in
personality and emotional makeup that may accompany early
dementia-in other words, dementia that has not reached a point
at which it would cause impairment that is immediately obvious.
A substantial fraction of demented individuals become
paranoid.'2 9 They believe, for example, that their belongings
have been stolen because they cannot remember that they used
and moved them. 3 o The paranoia may take the form of diffuse
124 Standard medical evaluation of individuals with dementia includes history
taking, a physical examination, and blood and urine testing, which can be helpful in
ruling out metabolic problems, infections, and organ failure as causes. Brain
imaging with a CT or MRI scan can often detect evidence of vascular lesions,
structural changes, or regional deterioration of brain tissue. Id. at 14-70.
125 The technical term is aphasia. For example, persons with dementia may have
trouble recalling and using names of objects, so they use more general terms such as
"it" or "thing." See Karen S. Santacruz & Daniel Swagerty, Early Diagnosis of
Dementia, 63 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 703, 705 (2001). As some dementias progress,
volume of speech decreases; eventually, some sufferers stop speaking. See Mario F.
Mendez & Beth A. Zander, Dementia Presenting with Aphasia: Clinical
Characteristics, 54 J. NEUROLOGY, NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY 542, 542-44
(1991) (providing descriptions, examples and discussions of progressing dementias).
126The technical term is apraxia. The impairment occurs despite the individual's
having intact motor function and sense of touch. Apraxic persons may have trouble
writing or tying shoelaces. See S. Della Sala et al., Ideomotor Apraxia in Patients
with Dementia ofAlzheimers Type, 234 J. NEUROLOGY 91 (1987).
127 The technical term is agnosia, and the impairment in recognition occurs
despite intact visual and touch perception. See Santacruz & Swagerty, supra note
125, at 706-07. As dementia progresses, its sufferers may fail to recognize even close
family members. See id.
12 These difficulties, termed "loss of executive functioning," include problems
with carrying out steps of a task in the proper order, making appropriate decisions,
and evaluating situations. CHARLES SETH LANDEFELD ET AL., CURRENT GERIATRIC
DIAGNOSIS & TREATMENT 62 (2004). Examples include problems with cooking
(lighting a burner without putting water in the pot) and loss of ability to balance
one's checkbook. See id.
12' See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 36, at 150.
130

See id.
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suspiciousness or specific delusions about being persecuted or
mistreated.a3 Anxiousness, abrupt changes in mood, and anger
outbursts may also occur, especially when demented individuals
are confronted by their limitations or a failure to cope with
situations they once handled easily.13 2
Studies of persons with Alzheimer's dementia show that they
often experience impairments in their abilities to make decisions
even when their overall impairment is relatively mild.13 3 For
example, persons with early Alzheimer's may display problems
understanding information and reasoning. 3 4 As the dementia
progresses, many persons show significant impairment of
decisionmaking capacity even during simple tests. 3 5
B.

Schizophrenia,ParanoidType

Schizophrenia affects approximately one out of two-hundred
persons.13 6 The condition usually makes its appearance in the
late teenage years or young adulthood, but occasionally onset
occurs well after middle age.137 The classic, "positive" signs of
schizophrenia are hallucinations, delusions, and disorganized
speech or behavior.13 8 Over the last two decades, however, it has
become increasingly clear that cognitive impairments and
"negative" symptoms-diminished affect, verbal production, and
initiative-account for much of the disability caused by

See id.
See id.
133 See Daniel C. Marson, Loss of Competency in Alzheimer's Disease: Conceptual
and Psychometric Approaches, 24 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 267, 276-78 (2001)
(summarizing studies).
134 See id. at 278.
135 See id.
136 Dinesh Bhugra, The Global Prevalence of Schizophrenia, 2 PUB. LIBR. SCI.
MED. 372, 372 (2005) (citing study results of 0.0046 for point prevalence, 0.0033 for
period prevalence, and 0.0072 for lifetime morbid risk).
137 See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 36, at 314.
*1 See id. at 312. A diagnosis of schizophrenia requires that individuals
experience these symptoms for at least six months, that they experience a marked
deterioration in social or occupational functioning, and that other conditionsincluding medical conditions, intoxicants, and mood disorders-be eliminated as
potential causes of the symptoms. Id. A closely related syndrome, schizophreniform
disorder, has the same signs and symptoms as schizophrenia, but its duration is
under six months and it need not be accompanied by functional deterioration. Id. at
317-19.
131
132
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schizophrenia. 3 9
Antipsychotic medication, the mainstay of
treatment for schizophrenia, can in most cases reduce or
eliminate many positive symptoms, but residual signs and
negative symptoms often remain.14 0 Even without treatment,
though, the severity of schizophrenia often fluctuates, as does the
impairment in functioning that accompanies the illness.14 1
As is the case with most mental disorders, researchers and
clinicians regard the development of schizophrenia in an
individual as the outcome of biological, psychological, and social
forces.
Five lines of evidence support the assertion that
biological factors contribute substantially to the development of
schizophrenia: (1) Strong genetic evidence comes from examining
co-occurrence of the condition in twins and other genetically close
family members, 4 2 and more recently, from studies identifying
specific genetic variations that influence the probability of the
disorder; 4 3 (2) Evidence for an impact of congenital influences

139 See, e.g., Victoria Villalta-Gil et al., NeurocognitivePerformance and Negative
Symptoms: Are They Equal in Explaining Disability in Schizophrenia Outpatients?
87 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 246, 246-47 (2006) ("Negative symptoms are the major
source of disability of our sample."). These features are termed "negative" symptoms
because they reflect the absence of normal psychological features.
140 Julie Kreyenbuhl et al., Adding or Switching Antipsychotic Medications in
Treatment-Refractory Schizphrenia, 58 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 983, 983-84 (2007)
(noting that "[al substantial proportion of patients with schizophrenia, estimated at
10% to 30% of outpatients, are considered resistant to standard antipsychotic
treatment," and citing studies).
141 See Thomas H. Jobe & Martin Harrow, Long-Term Outcome of Patients with
Schizophrenia: A Review, 50 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 892, 898 (2005) ("Even [though]
with current treatments, schizophrenia patients as a group show poorer outcome
than patients with other types of psychiatric disorders ... a subgroup of
schizophrenia patients shows intervals or periods of recovery.").
142 See, e.g., Alastair
G. Cardno & Irving I. Gottesman, Twin Studies of
Schizophrenia:From Bow-and-Arrow Concordances to Star Wars Mx and Functional
Genomics, 97 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 12, 12 (2000) (based on concordance rates in
identical (monozygotic) twins and fraternal (dizygotic) twins, heritability is
approximately 80 to 85%); Judy L. Thompson et al., Indicatorsof Genetic Liability to
Schizophrenia: A Sibling Study of Neuropsychological Performance, 31
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 85, 85 (2005) (observing that "[tiwin and adoption studies
have clearly indicated that genes have a major role in the etiology of schizophrenia").
1n See, e.g., Xiao-Wei Chen et al., DTNBP1, a SchizophreniaSusceptibility Gene,
Affects Kinetics of Transmitter Release, 181 J. CELL BIOLOGY 791, 791 (2008)
(studying the link dysbindin gene to schizophrenia, which provides a plausible
mechanism by which the gene might cause illness); Junxia Tang et al., Dysbindin-1
in DorsolateralPrefrontal Cortex of Schizophrenia Cases Is Reduced in an IsoformSpecific Manner Unrelated to Dysbindin-1 mRNA Expression, 18 HUM. MOLECULAR
GENETICS 3851, 3851 (2009) (decreased dysbindin-iC in portions of the brain may
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comes from observations that people born in winter or spring are
more likely to develop schizophrenia,'" as are people who were
exposed to certain infections while in utero;'4 5 (3) Evidence
suggests that, in persons with underlying vulnerability,
marijuana use can trigger the development of schizophrenia,
implying a biological causal mechanism for the disorder.146 Also,
administration of certain pharmaceuticals to persons without the
disorder can lead to development of symptoms that mimic
schizophrenia.1 4 7

contribute to the cognitive deficits of schizophrenia by promoting under-functioning
of specific receptors).
144 See Geoffrey Davies et al., A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of
Northern Hemisphere Season of Birth Studies in Schizophrenia, 29 SCHIZOPHRENIA
BULL. 587, 587 (2003) (finding that the excess population attributable risk for
winter/spring births is 3.3%).
145 See Alan S. Brown, Environment and Schizophrenia: PrenatalInfection as a
Risk Factorfor Schizophrenia, 32 SCHIZOPHRENIA. BULL. 200, 200 (2006) ("Prenatal
infections ... associated with schizophrenia include rubella, influenza, and
toxoplasmosis.").
146 See Sven Andr6asson et al., Cannabis and Schizophrenia: A Longitudinal
Study of Swedish Conscripts, 330 LANCET 1483, 1483 (1987) (relative risk for
schizophrenia among high cannabis users was 6.0); Michael T. Compton et al.,
Association of Pre-Onset Cannabis,Alcohol, and Tobacco Use with Age at Onset of
Prodrome and Age at Onset of Psychosis in First-Episode Patients, 166 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1251, 1255 (2009) (citing studies suggesting that pre-onset cannabis use
may be associated with an earlier age at onset of psychosis, showing a "possible
effect of pre-onset cannabis (and tobacco) use on age at onset of symptoms," and
describing possible biological mechanisms); Louisa Degenhardt & Wayne Hall, Is
Cannabis Use a Contributory Cause of Psychosis? 51 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 556, 563
(2006) (finding that marijuana can precipitate schizophrenia in persons with
personal or family history of schizophrenia); Stephen M. Eggan et al., Reduced
Cortical Cannabinoid 1 Receptor Messenger RNA and Protein Expression in
Schizophrenia, 65 ARCHiVE GEN. PSYCHIATRY 772, 772 (2008) (concluding that the
link between marijuana use and schizophrenia may be due to reduced expression of
the cannabinoid receptor in brains of persons with schizophrenia).
147 Adrienne C. Lahti et al., Effects of Ketamine in Normal and Schizophrenic
Volunteers, 25 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 455, 455 (2001) (finding that, in
normal persons, ketamine can cause short-lived psychotic symptoms similar to
responses of persons with schizophrenia).
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(4) Brain imaging studies have documented differences in
brain configurations 4 s and neural activityl 4 9 among people
diagnosed with schizophrenia.
(5) Finally, overwhelming
evidence shows that medications-especially those that block
activity of the brain's dopamine D2 receptor150-are effective in
alleviating some symptoms of schizophrenia, suggesting an
impact on a pathological condition that is biological.' 5 '
Although biological
factors create an individual's
vulnerability to developing schizophrenia, social and individual
psychological factors influence the risk of having the condition,
its impact, and its clinical course. Living in cities, poverty, and
minority status are among the social factors that increase the
risk of developing schizophrenia.152 Childhood abuse or trauma
appears to affect symptoms and the severity of schizophrenia
later in life,15 3 and unsupportive, dysfunctional family
relationships are a risk factor for relapse following recovery from
an episode of psychosis.' 5 4 Persons with schizophrenia exhibit
psychological traits, particularly an impaired capacity to
appreciate their own and other persons' mental states, that
adversely affect their social competence. 5 5 Also, depressed mood,

a See Laura A. Flashman & Michael F. Green, Review of Cognition and Brain
Structure in Schizophrenia:Profiles, Longitudinal Course, and Effects of Treatment,
27 PSYCHIATRY CLINICS N. AM. 1, 3 (2004) (reviewing "[niumerous studies [that]
have examined neuroanatomical features of schizophrenia").
149 See Heather C. Whalley et al., Correlations Between fMRI Activation and
Individual Psychotic Symptoms in Un-Medicated Subjects at High Genetic Risk of
Schizophrenia, 7 BMC PSYCHIATRY 61 (2007) (hallucinations related to altered
functioning of lateral temporal cortex; other psychotic symptoms related to altered
medial temporal lobe function).
150See H. M. Jones & L. S. Pilowsky, Dopamine and Antipsychotic Drug Action
Revisited, 181 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 271, 271 (2002) (finding that all "antipsychotic
drugs have at least some degree of antagonism of the dopamine D2 receptors").
15. See id. at 272-73 (abnormal dopamine transmission in schizophrenia).
152 See generally Jim van Os et al., The SchizophreniaEnvirome,
18 CURR. OPIN.
PSYCHIATRY 141 (2005) (discussing evidence for increased risk and suggesting
biological pathways that may mediate or transmit impact of environment).
11 See Lindsay S. Schenkel et al., Histories of Childhood Maltreatment in
Schizophrenia: Relationships with Premorbid Functioning, Symptomatology, and
Cognitive Deficits, 76 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 273, 281, 283 (2005) (contending that

childhood maltreatment influences specific forms of cognitive dysfunction).
154 See Ronald L. Butzlaff & Jill M. Hooley, Expressed Emotion and Psychiatric
Relapse: A Meta-Analysis, 55 ARCHIvES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 547, 548-49 (1998)
(synthesizing results from twenty-seven studies of expressed emotion).
1-5 See Martin Brtine et al., Mental State Attribution, Neurocognitive
Functioning, and Psychopathology: What Predicts Poor Social Competence in
Schizophrenia Best? 92 SCIZOPHRENIA RES. 151, 152, 158 (2007).
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low self-esteem, and negative views of oneself and others
correlate with having persecutory delusions that are more severe
and more preoccupying,'5 6 and specific types of symptoms in
schizophrenia are comprehensible as types of cognitive biases or
emotional states."' Thus, although psychosis is biologically
based, symptoms of schizophrenia are amenable to techniques,
such as cognitive-behavioral therapy, that have proven useful for
persons with nonpsychotic conditions such as depression and
anxiety disorders.'
Because schizophrenia has various manifestations, Eugen
Bleuler referred to "schizophrenias" when he coined the term.5 9
The current U.S. diagnostic system lists five subtypes of
schizophrenia; of these, the "paranoid type" is of chief interest
here because it is the type most likely to produce beliefs about
one's spouse that might provide motivate one to seek a divorce
without causing other impairments-such as the ability to
communicate coherently-that are needed to initiate a divorce
action.16 0 Persons with paranoid schizophrenia display normal
amounts of affect, and their speech, behavior, and thinking are

156See Ben Smith et al., Emotion and Psychosis:Links Between Depression, SelfEsteem, Negative Schematic Beliefs and Delusions and Hallucinations, 86
SCHIZOPHRENIA REs. 181, 186 (2006).
15, See Aaron T. Beck, A Cognitive Model of Schizophrenia, 18 J. COGNITIVE
PSYCHOTHERAPY 281 (2004).
a See Elizabeth Kuipers et al., Cognitive, Emotional, and Social Processes in
Psychosis: Refining Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for PersistentPositive Symptoms,
32 SCHIZOPHRENIA BuLL. S24, S27-29 (2006) (describing therapeutic procedures and
their rationale).
DEMENTIA PRAECOX OR THE GROUP OF
159 See EUGEN BLEULER,
SCHIZOPHRENIAS 9-10 (Joseph Zinkin trans., International Universities Press 1950).
' The other four subtypes of schizophrenia usually are much more disabling,
and the outward signs of these disorders are quickly recognized-even by
nonclinicians-as indications of severe mental problems. Sufferers of "disorganized"
schizophrenia have disorganized speech and behavior accompanied by inappropriate
emotional responses. Persons with "catatonic" schizophrenia display motor
immobility, stupor, rigid posturing, mutism, stereotyped and repetitive movements,
or excessive poorly organized activity ("catatonic excitement"). Persons with
"undifferentiated" schizophrenia hallucinate and have disorganized thinking; they
do not usually have the types of delusions that would motivate one to seek a divorce,
and they also lack initiative or interest in extended, determined activity. Similarly,
persons with "residual" schizophrenia lack delusions that would provide "reasons"
for a divorce; they also usually have impaired motivation. See DSM-IV-TR, supra
note 36, at 313-17.
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organized and coherent.' When ill, however, they typically have
delusions that they are being persecuted and that their
persecutors intend to harm them, and if the illness that
generates these ideas is left untreated, delusions may become
more-than-ample justification for taking action to respond to
threats that seem very real.162
C.

Delusional Disorder

In schizophrenia, delusions typically have "bizarre"6 3
content-that is, the delusions contain elements that could not
possibly be true, such as that one's brain contains an electronic
thought transmission device. Also, persons with schizophrenia
experience other symptoms, as has just been discussed, and
deterioration in overall functioning. By contrast, persons with
delusional disorder experience the insidious development of
systematized delusions about things that are physically possible.
They often do not experience the psychosocial dysfunction that
accompanies schizophrenia, and their thinking and behavior
remain clear and orderly. They hallucinate little or not at all,
though much of what they feel, say, and do may reflect their
Thus, a person with delusional disorder who
delusional ideas.
believes he is being targeted by "Mafia hit men" may stop
working, leave his house only at night, and wear disguises-that
is, his decisions and behavior are logical, organized responses to
a premise which, though physically possible, has no basis in
reality. 6 5
161 Another way of saying this is that the form of their thoughts and behavior
are normal, but the content of their thoughts can be quite irrational, and their
actions may be motivated by delusional ideas.
162 See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 36, at 313-14 (noting "relative preservation of
cognitive functioning and affect" in paranoid schizophrenia, along with potential for
delusions with themes of persecution or jealousy that are "organized around a
coherent theme" and that can be associated with argumentativeness and anger that
'may predispose the individual to violence).
1" Though "bizarreness" can be hard to evaluate, DSM-IV-TR deems delusions
"bizarre if they are clearly implausible . . . and not derived from ordinary life
experiences." Id. at 324.
'6 The full requirements for a diagnosis of delusional disorder are (a) nonbizarre
delusions that have lasted at least one month, (b) never having met diagnostic
criteria for schizophrenia, (c) neither bizarre behavior nor marked impairment in
functioning (apart from the direct impact of the delusion(s)), (d) absence, or at most
brief, duration of mood symptoms, and (e) absence of a medical or substance-induced
cause for the delusion(s). See id. at 329.

165 Id. at 324.
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Delusional disorder is an uncommon condition.'6 6
Psychiatrists have therefore studied it less than schizophrenia,
and they know much less about the origin of delusional
disorder."' Because individuals with neurological conditions
affecting the basal ganglia and limbic system can have a clinical
presentation similar to delusional disorder-that is, complex
delusions but intact cognitive functioning-it is theorized that
delusional disorder may itself involve disturbances in the basal
ganglia and limbic system.'6 8 However, a number of psychosocial
factors-social isolation, sensory deprivation such as deafness,
socioeconomic conditions, and personality characteristics-are
associated with delusional disorder and may play an a role in the
condition's pathogenesis not yet fully understood. 69
Delusional disorder is currently classified in several
subtypes. The subtypes of greatest interest for this Article's
concerns are those accompanied by delusions that might produce
a basis-in the sufferer's mind-for seeking a divorce. Thus, the
erotomanic type,170 jealous type,' 7 ' and persecutory type 72 are all
conditions that might generate a delusional motivation for
seeking divorce but a potential lack of competence to do so.' 7 3
Despite its relative rarity in the general population, several
factors give delusional disorder a substantial diagnostic
significance in the present context. First, unlike schizophrenia,

166

See BENJAMIN J. SADOCK ET AL.,

PSYCHIATRY

KAPLAN & SADOCK'S SYNOPSIS OF
504 (2007) [hereinafter SADOCK ET AL.] (finding that the U.S.

prevalence is 0.025-0.03%, "much rarer than schizophrenia").
1'
See, e.g., Alastair G. Cardno & Peter McGuffin, Genetics and Delusional
Disorder, 24 BEHAV. SCl. & L. 257 (2006) (observing that the rarity of multiply
affected families has prohibited genetic linkage studies and has limited studies of
molecular genetics).
168 SADOCK ET AL., supra note 166, at 506.

Id.
This subtype is characterized by delusions that another individual, often
someone of higher status, loves the person with the disorder. See DSM-IV-TR, supra
note 36, at 329.
171 A person with this
subtype has delusions that his sexual partner is
unfaithful. See id.
172 Persons with this subtype have delusions that they are being treated
malevolently in some way. See id.
173 Other subtypes
of delusional disorder are characterized by grandiose
delusions (delusions of inflated worth, power, or knowledge, or having a special
relationship with a deity or famous person), somatic delusions (delusions about
having some physical defect or medical condition), and mixed delusions (having
delusions of more than one type, though no single theme predominates). Id.
169
170
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delusional disorder has a relatively late onset, 17 4 meaning that
individuals are more likely to develop the disorder after the ages
at which most people first marry. Second, though persons with
delusional disorder may seem odd or eccentric, they usually have
no behavioral disturbance that would make their illness obvious
to persons who are not mental health professionals."' Third,
many persons with delusional disorder neither recognize their
own problems nor see any need to get treatment, 7 6 and they may
not experience impairments that would qualify them for
involuntarily imposed psychiatric care."7 Finally, persons with
delusional disorder attempt to engage clinicians in accepting
their delusions, and because they are sometimes litigious, 7 8 they
may consult and even convince attorneys that they have realitybased grievances against a spouse that would legitimatize a
divorce.'7 ' Thus, given that a person seeking divorce has a
psychotic motive for doing so, delusional disorder obtains a
diagnostic probability far above what its comparatively low
incidence in the general population would imply.
D. Affective Disorders

In general, "affective disorders" are mental conditions of
which the salient symptom is pervasively and persistently
abnormal mood. These disorders may include manic episodesmulti-day periods of elated, expansive, or irritable mood, coupled
with markedly increased activity, rapid or "pressured" speech,
and inflated self-esteemo80 -depressive episodes-multi-week
174The mean age of onset is forty years, but the range stretches from late
adolescence to the very elderly. SADOCK ET AL., supra note 166, at 505.
175 "The most remarkable feature of patients with delusional disorder is that the
mental status examination shows them to be quite normal except for [theirl
markedly abnormal delusional system." SADOCK ET AL., supra note 166, at 506.
no That is, they lack insight into their illness. Id. at 508.
177But see Phillip Fennell & Robert Lloyd Goldstein, The Application of Civil
Commitment Law and Practices to a Case of Delusional Disorder:A Cross-National
Comparison of Legal Approaches in the United States and the United Kingdom, 24
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 385, 385 (2006) (discussing potential commitment of a person with
delusional disorder because of dangerousness).
178See SADOCK ET AL., supra note 166, at 506.

179 See JOHN PARRY & ERIC YORK DROGIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE
AND TESTIMONY: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE MANUAL FOR LAWYERS, JUDGES,
AND MENTAL DISABILITY PROFESSIONALS 63 (2007) (noting that delusional disorder

may be difficult to detect in part because "the state of affairs alleged by a patient or
client could conceivably occur in real life" (emphasis added)).
* See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 36, at 362.
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periods of low mood, much-diminished enjoyment of normally
pleasant activities, decreased or increased sleep, low energy,
altered motor activity, and feeling guilty or worthless' 81-or
episodes in which manic and depressive symptoms occur
simultaneously. 18 2 In the most severe cases, persons with
affective disorders experience delusions, hallucinations, or other
psychotic symptoms; when mood disorders display these features,
they are termed "affective psychoses."' 83 Sufferers of a related
syndrome, schizoaffective disorder, have some episodes in which
they primarily experience the symptoms of schizophrenia, and
other episodes in which affective symptoms are predominant.18
Affective psychoses and schizoaffective disorders have a
biopsychosocial causation, that is, their onset and manifestations
reflect a combination of neurological, hereditary, and
environmental influences. For example, a Danish population
study of 2.1 million persons showed that having a first-degree
relative with bipolar disorder greatly heightened one's risk of
developing the condition, as did the death of one's mother before
age five years. 8 5 Individuals' statistical risk of developing
depression is greatly influenced by family history' 6 and

See id. at 356.
Id. at 362-63.
1
See, e.g., RICHARD SLOANE, THE SLOANE-DORLAND ANNOTATED MEDICALLEGAL DICTIONARY 591 (1987).
181
182

18 "Since schizoaffective disorder was first introduced as a concept in 1933,
there has been no clear consensus about its definition." Thomas Munk Laursen et
al., Family History of Psychiatric Illness as a Risk Factor for Schizoaffective
Disorder: A Danish Register-Based Cohort Study, 62 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY
841, 841 (2005). Current U.S. diagnostic criteria for schizoaffective disorder are
complicated, but in essence they require: (1) a one-month period in which the
individual has a combination of delusions, hallucinations, disordered thinking, or
"negative" symptoms typical of schizophrenia; (2) the individual must have
experienced episodes of affective illness for a substantial portion of the time he or
she has been ill; (3) at some point, the individual had delusions or hallucinations for
at least two weeks without prominent mood symptoms; (4) the disturbance is not
caused by a substance of abuse, a medication, or another medical condition. See
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 36, at 323.
185See Preben Bo Mortensen et al., Individual and Familial Risk Factors for
BipolarAffective Disordersin Denmark, 60 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1209, 1209
(2003).
186 See Myrna M. Weissman et al., Families at High and Low Risk for
Depression: A 3-Generation Study, 62 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 29, 29 (2005)
(noting higher rates of psychopathology in children whose parents and grandparents
had moderately to severely impairing depression).
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personality characteristics."' Studies of familial patterns of
affective and psychotic disorders suggest that schizoaffective
disorder has genetic components'" and is genetically related to
both schizophrenic and bipolar illnesses.189
Mood disorders alter persons' decisionmaking. Individuals
with nonpsychotic depression may have problems with
concentration, processing information,o90 and reasoning,' 9 ' and
these problems may be accentuated and exacerbated by the
simultaneous presence of delusional motivations for certain
actions.' 9 2 Persons with mania characteristically display poor
judgment. The heightened energy associated with a manic
episode may make persons more prone to act precipitously on
delusional ideas, or respond rashly to grandiose ideas or
perceived slights.

1I See Kenneth S. Kendler et al., Personalityand Major Depression:A Swedish
Longitudinal, Population-Based Twin Study, 63 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1113,
1113 (2006). "[Nleuroticism strongly reflects" vulnerability to depression, though
"substantial proportions of the genetic vulnerability to [depression] are not reflected
in neuroticism." Id.
" See Aksel Bertelsen & Irving I. Gottesman, Schizoaffective Psychoses:
Genetical Clues to Classification, 60 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 7, 7 (1995). Though
findings from family, twin, and adoption studies diverge, they support a separate
classification of schizoaffective psychoses with relationships to affective psychoses
and schizophrenia. Id.
1" See Laursen et al., supra note 184, at 847. Familial illness patterns suggest
schizoaffective disorder may be either a subtype of bipolar disorder and
schizophrenia or a genetically intermediate form. Id.
190 See
Meryl A. Butters et al., The Nature and Determinants of
Neuropsychological Functioning in Late-Life Depression, 61 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 587, 587 (2004) ("Late-life depression is characterized by slowed
information processing, which affects all realms of cognition.").
"' See Carl Elliott, Caring About Risks: Are Severely Depressed Patients
Competent To Consent to Research? 54 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 113, 113 (1997)
(questioning whether decisions of severely depressed persons "are authentically
theirs," and whether some severely depressed persons may lack needed concern for
their own welfare).
11 See Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Competence of Depressed Patientsfor Consent

to Research, 156 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1380, 1383 (1999). Although persons with

moderate depression have good decisionmaking capacity, persons with severe
depression, "especially those with psychotic depression, may manifest higher levels
of decisional incapacity." Id.
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IV. CASE LAW ON INCOMPETENCE AND DIVORCE

Divorcinga Spouse Who Has Been Adjudicated Incompetent
Until the twentieth century, a person seeking to divorce a
mentally ill person often could not do so. 93 In general, more
recent divorce statutes and case law have allowed competent
persons to seek divorces from spouses adjudged mentally ill
subject to certain conditions.' 94 As we noted earlier,9 persons
may divorce spouses who have "incurable insanity" or who are
undergoing long-term psychiatric hospitalization. Given current
practices and available treatments, however, relatively few
incompetent individuals would now be divorceable on such
grounds. In some cases, trial courts have found that the mental
illness of a respondent spouse existed when the couple married
and have allowed annulment-though not divorce-based on the
idea that a marriage is void if entered into by an incompetent."'

A.

B.

Initiationof Divorce by IndividualsAdjudicated Incompetent
In contrast to the problems posed by Mr. Doe's divorce
petition, most published decisions dealing with issues of
competence and divorce concern petitioners who have already
been adjudicated incompetent to manage personal affairs. In
these situations, the question for the trial court becomes whether
19 See FAMILY LAW & PRACTICE, GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE § 4.03(2) (2009).
However, divorce actions "may be instituted against insane defendants for a cause of
divorce committed before the period of insanity." lago v. Iago, 48 N.E. 30, 31 (Ill.
1897). This remained permissible in the twentieth century. See Huguley v. Huguley,
51 S.E.2d 445, 447-48 (Ga. 1949) (holding that the husband could sue his insane
wife for divorce on the grounds of cruelty inflicted prior to her insanity).
194 See, e.g., Box v. Box, 45 So. 2d 157, 159 (Ala. 1950); Miller v. Miller, 487
S.W.2d 382, 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (setting aside divorce decree when an
incompetent defendant was not represented by a guardian ad litem or general
guardian); see also Stephens v. Stephens, 45 So. 2d 153, 154 (Ala. 1950) (setting
aside divorce decree where an incompetent defendant's guardian ad litem ignored
the defendant and proceedings were transacted ex parte without notice to
defendant).
9 See supra Part II.B.4.
"9 See, e.g., Cox v. Armstrong, 221 P.2d 371, 373 (Colo. 1950) (conservator of
incompetent person may bring suit for annulment of marriage on ground of insanity,
although he or she may not bring suit for divorce); De Nardo v. De Nardo, 293 N.Y.
550, 553, 59 N.E.2d 241, 242 (1944) (holding annulment acceptable instead of
divorce because the party was mentally ill at time of marriage). But see Geitner v.
Townsend, 312 S.E.2d 236, 238 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that the prior
adjudication of incompetency was not conclusive on the issue of later capacity to
marry; therefore, the marriage was not necessarily subject to annulment).
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an incompetent petitioner to maintain a
a guardian, guardian ad litem, or next
states have barred incompetent persons
through guardians or intermediaries. 9'

Two rationales support this position. First, a guardian's powers
are statutory creations, and absent a specific statutory provision
to file for a divorce on behalf of a ward, a guardian lacks legal
authority to do so.s9 8 Second, the right to sue for divorce is
strictly personal and volitional in nature, and
must ... remain personal to the spouse aggrieved by the acts
and conduct of the other. Inasmuch as there are no marital
offenses which in and of themselves work a dissolution of the
marriage relation, or which may not be condoned, the marital
relation can be dissolved only with the consent and at the
instigation of the injured spouse personally, and manifestly,
such consent cannot be given by one who is legally insane.'99
Two states-Alabama and Massachusetts-have for decades
explicitly allowed an incompetent petitioner to maintain a
divorce action through a representative. In Massachusetts, a
statutory provision expressly allows a divorce action initiated on
behalf of an incompetent person. 2 0
In Alabama, statutory
provisions have been interpreted broadly to allow for a divorce
action to be brought on the incompetent's behalf.201 More
recently, other states have permitted guardians to initiate
divorce actions on behalf of wards.20 2
1" See J.A. Connelly, Annotation, Power of Incompetent Spouse's Guardian,
Committee, or Next of Friend To Sue for Granting or Vacation of Divorce or
Annulment of Marriage, or To Make a Compromise or Settlement in Such Suit, 6
A.L.R.3d 681 § 2 (1966).
19 See In re Marriage of Drews, 503 N.E.2d 339, 340 (Ill. 1986) (citing several
cases from other jurisdictions).
'9 Scott v. Scott, 45 So. 2d 878, 879 (Fla. 1950), superseded by statute, Fla Stat.
§ 61.042 (West 2010) (repealed 1971), as recognized in Vaughan v. Guardianship of
Vaughan, 648 So. 2d 193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
1 See Garnett v. Garnett, 114 Mass. 379, 380 (1874) (citing statutory authority
allowing "a libel for divorce [to] be filed and prosecuted in behalf of an insane
person").
a' See Campbell v. Campbell, 5 So. 2d 401, 402 (Ala. 1941) (noting that statutes
"authorize the bill to be filed by the next friend for and in the name of the non
compos mentis"); accord Hopson v. Hopson, 57 So. 2d 505 (Ala. 1952).
1 See, e.g., Ruvalcaba v. Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d 674, 681 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that a spouse who has been adjudged incapacitated retains the means to
dissolve his marriage, and a guardian may assert that right on behalf of the ward);
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C.

Specific Incompetence To Divorce
Our efforts to locate decisions providing competence criteria
that might apply to plaintiffs like Mr. Doe-that is, to individuals
whose wishes to divorce reflect psychotic motivations, but who
are not necessarily incompetent to manage most aspects of their
affairs-yielded just seven cases. We review these here.
1.

Shenk v. Shenk
Mrs. Shenk sought to divorce her husband alleging gross
neglect of duty and extreme cruelty.2 0 3 Mr. Shenk responded by
asserting that his wife suffered from a mental impairment so
serious that she had been awarded total permanent disability for
purposes of her life insurance, and that she therefore lacked the
requisite mental capacity to maintain a divorce action."
The
trial court refused to let Mr. Shenk put on witnesses to suggest
his wife's mental incompetence, but allowed a doctor to testify
that he had examined Mrs. Shenk four months following the
filing of her divorce petition and found that she was competent
then.2 05 The trial court, noting that it was "not trying this
woman's sanity at all," made no determination concerning Mrs.
Shenk's competence during the trial and granted the divorce.20 6
Mr. Shenk appealed, arguing that the trial court erred (1) in not
determining whether his wife was competent before moving
forward with the action and (2) in refusing to let him introduce
evidence of his wife's mental illness.20 7
The appeals court reversed the trial court's ruling. A
previous case held that in Ohio, an incompetent person could not
maintain a divorce action for divorce on his own behalf or
through a guardian.20 8 This meant that the Shenk trial court was

Kronberg v. Kronberg, 623 A.2d 806, 811 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993) (exercising
substituted judgment, concluding that wife "would have filed suit for divorce against
her husband"); Nelson v. Nelson, 878 P.2d 335, 340 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
that, in light of statutory provisions governing both guardianships and divorces, a
guardian in New Mexico has authority to file for divorce under certain
circumstances). Several cases discussed in the following sections reflect similar
views about guardians' powers.
20o Shenk v. Shenk, 135 N.E.2d 436, 437 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954).
24 Id.
at 437-38.
20 Id. at 438.
20

Id.

207

See id.

21

See Jack v. Jack, 75 N.E.2d 484, 488 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947).
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obligated, under a statute in force when the case was heard, 209 to
determine the competence 2 10 of a party to a divorce if competence
was undetermined at the time of trial and was challenged by an
opposing party. 211 The appeals court noted that a divorce action
"depends entirely upon the intelligent exercise of the will or
volition of the plaintiff," and the trial court needed to know
whether "that will or volition is expressed by a sane and
competent person."2 12
2.

Higgason v. Higgason

The case of Higgason v. Higgason2 13 concerned a woman who
had been placed under conservatorship and had sought to end
her marriage through a guardian ad litem, her adopted daughter.
The Supreme Court of California determined that a spouse could
petition for dissolution of her marriage through a guardian ad
litem, "provided it is established that the spouse is capable of
exercising a judgment, and expressing a wish, that the marriage
be dissolved on account of irreconcilable differences and has done
so." 21 4 The court explained that simply having a conservator did
"not constitute a determination that the conservatee [was] in any
way 'insane or incompetent.' "215 Being a conservatee required
the wife to bring her divorce suit through a guardian ad litem,
but it did not preclude her from bringing the suit entirely. 216 The
supreme court noted that the trial court had found that the wife
"had the ability to think," had "signed and verified the petition
for the dissolution of [her] marriage," and had signed and verified
"two declarations . .. support[ing] . . . an order to show cause for
[an] injunct[ion] ... against [her] husband's visiting her
209 In the revised numbering system that took effect in October 1953,
the
relevant statute is § 2307.15, which reads in its entirety, "[wihen the insanity of a
party is not manifest to the court, and the fact of insanity is disputed by a party or
an attorney in the action, the court may try the question, or impanel a jury to try it."
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.15 (LexisNexis 2010).
210 Though the statute refers to "sanity," "competence" is a better term in the
current context, because the question for the court is whether the individual has a
requisite legal capacity.
211 See Shenk, 135 N.E.2d at 438-39.
212 Id. at 439.
213 516 P.2d 289, 291 (Cal. 1973), overruled on other grounds
by Dawley v.
Dawley, 551 P.2d 323 (Cal. 1976).
21
215
216

Id. at 294.

Id.
Id.
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[home]."217 Moreover, the court saw the wife's verbal assertion of
her desire to dissolve the marriage during a pre-trial deposition
as evidence proving she was competent to institute the
dissolution proceedings through her guardian ad litem.218
3.

Boyd v. Edwards

In 1968, Charles Edwards filed a divorce action against his
wife, Essie.2 19 In 1970, while the divorce action was pending, Mr.
Edwards had a serious motorcycle accident that resulted in
hypoxic brain damage. 220 After his release from the hospital in
1971, Mr. Edwards went to live with his sister, Ann Boyd. 2 2 ' The
divorce action was dismissed in 1972 because of Mr. Edwards's
incompetence.2 2 2 In 1980, Ms. Boyd, who had become her
brother's guardian in 1976, filed a new divorce action against
Mrs. Edwards on behalf of Mr. Edwards.2 23 Mr. Edwards did not
appear at the trial,2 24 but his sister testified about his inability to
express feelings and to dress, bathe, and feed himself.225 Though
Mrs. Edwards contended that her husband had not expressed a
desire to divorce,2 26 the trial court granted the divorce because
the statutory provision of living apart for at least two years had
been satisfied.2 2 7
Mrs. Edwards appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the court
had erred by granting the divorce without having established
that Mr. Edwards indeed could not testify.2 28
Ms. Boyd
maintained that the trial court had no duty to ascertain the
1\
wishes of an incompetent spouse where a guardian could prove
statutory requirements under Ohio's "no fault" divorce law.22 9
The appeals court agreed with Mrs. Edwards, finding
evidence that Mr. Edwards actually could speak and express his

217
218

219
220
221
2

Id.
Id. at 292-93.
Boyd v. Edwards, 446 N.E.2d 1151, 1153 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982).
Id.
Id.
Id.

m Id. at 1152-53.
Id. at 1153.
" Id. at 1154.
22
227

Id.
Id.

at 1153.

I Id. at 1154.
' Id. at 1154-55.
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feelings, 2 3 0 and suggested that the separation may not have been
entirely voluntarily.23 ' Under these circumstances, the trial
court had a duty to determine whether Mr. Edwards was
competent to testify, and if so, to learn his true desires regarding
the divorce.2 32 The appeals court cited several cases in which
mentally ill persons had been allowed to maintain divorce actions
because they retained sufficient capacity to express clear desires
for divorce, to understand proceedings, to exercise judgment, or
to testify about their wishes for divorce.233
4.

In re Marriageof Kutchins
The husband in In re Marriage of Kutchins234 had been
placed under a guardianship of his estate in early 1983; though a
guardianship of his person had also been requested, the request
was denied.2 35 Four months later, Mr. Kutchins filed an action
for marital dissolution, which his wife challenged based on her
husband's earlier adjudication as disabled and his subsequent
lack of capacity to bring a legal action.2 36 Mrs. Kutchins's motion
was granted and the case was dismissed.23 7
Mr. Kutchins appealed the dismissal. 23 8 The appeals court
noted that no Illinois case had held that having only a guardian
of estate rendered a person incompetent to seek a divorce.23
Id. at 1157.
Id. at 1159.
Id. at 1157-58.
233 Id. at 1158 (citing Higgason v. Higgason,
516 P.2d 289, 294 (Cal. 1973),
overruled by Dawley v. Dawley, 551 P.2d 323, 325 (Cal. 1976)); id. at 1158-59 (citing
Akin v. Akin, 135 S.E. 402 (Ga. 1926)) (approving the holding where a "plaintiff, on
furlough from a mental institution, had sufficient capacity to sue for a divorce"); id.
at 1158 (citing Spooner v. Spooner, 97 S.E. 670 (Ga. 1918)) (approving the holding
that the plaintiff had "sufficient capacity to maintain a divorce action"); id. at 1159
(citing Stevens v. Stevens, 254 N.W. 162, 163 (Mich. 1934), superseded by statute,
GCR 1963, 201.5(1), as recognized in Smith v. Smith, 335 N.W.2d 657, 658 (Mich.
1983)) (approving the holding where substituting wife as plaintiff in divorce action
originally brought by her guardian was proper because wife could "understand the
nature of the divorce proceedings"); id. (citing Turner v. Bell, 279 S.W.2d 71, 80-81
(Tenn. 1955)) (approving the holding where a "plaintiff-wife previously adjudged
incompetent ... had the requisite volition to seek divorce, and the capacity to testify
and maintain the action").
23' 482 N.E.2d 1005 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
1 Id. at 1006.
236 Id.
2 Id.
2 Id.
2 See id.
230
231
232
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However, an earlier Illinois case held that what might constitute
incompetence for purpose should not necessarily apply for a
different legal matter; "[n]o definite rule can be laid down which
will apply to all cases alike."24 0 The standard for competence to
manage one's financial affairs and the standard of competence to
Concerning the latter
file for a divorce were different."
standard, the appeals court held that
[tihe test of the mental capacity required for filing a petition for
dissolution of marriage is whether the petitioner has sufficient
mental capacity to understand fully the meaning and effect of
the petition and whether the petitioner is able to determine in
his own interest that he desires a final separation. 242
Reasoning that an individual who did not need a guardian of the
person had the requisite mental capacity to file a divorce suit, the
appeals court reversed and remanded the dismissal of the
petition for divorce to the trial court.243
5.

Murray v. Murray

Fletcher and Charlie Belle Murray had been married for
eighteen years when, in early January 1990, Fletcher fell ill.2"
After a two-week hospitalization, Fletcher went to the home of
his son, Allan. 24 5 There, Fletcher received around-the-clock care
until October 1991, when he was placed in a nursing home.24 6
Allan had been appointed his father's attorney-in-fact in
December 1989 and was subsequently appointed his father's
conservator and guardian of estate in March 1990.247 Following
Mrs. Murray's successful action for separate support and
maintenance in February 1990, Allan brought an action for
divorce on behalf of his father in November 1991.24 Mrs. Murray
moved to dismiss the action on grounds that her stepson could

Snyder v. Snyder, 31 N.E. 303, 306 (Ill. 1892).
See In re Marriageof Kutchins, 482 N.E.2d at 1006-07.
242 Id. at 1007.
24 Id. at 1007-08.
24 Murray v. Murray, 426 S.E.2d 781, 782 (S.C. 1993).
240
24

24

Id.

Id.
247 Id.
248 Id.
246
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not bring a divorce action suit on behalf of his father, but the
trial court denied her motion and ultimately granted the
divorce. 49
Mrs. Murray appealed the trial court's denial of her motion
to dismiss. 250 The Supreme Court of South Carolina noted that
whether a guardian may sue for divorce had never been
addressed in the state. 2 5 1 The court also noted that South
Carolina defined an "incapacitated person" as a "person who is
impaired by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, physical
illness or disability, advanced age. . . to the extent that he lacks
sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate
responsible decisions concerning his person or property," but
questioned whether this determination was ever made in
Fletcher's case.252 The court adopted the "majority rule" that
bars suits for divorce brought on behalf of a person who is
mentally incompetent to manage his estate and person.25 The
court, however, added,
we decline to impose an absolute rule denying the right to seek
a divorce if the spouse, although mentally incompetent with
respect to the management of his estate, is capable of exercising
reasonable judgment as to his personal decisions, is able to
understand the nature of the action and is able to express
unequivocally a desire to dissolve the marriage.254
Noting that the trial court had made no finding concerning
Fletcher's competence, the supreme court remanded the case for
a determination of Fletcher's competence and to clarify whether
he indeed desired to obtain a divorce. 25 5
6.

Syno v. Syno
Mr. Syno, who had previously been adjudged incompetent to
manage his estate, filed for and obtained a divorce on his own

249

Id.

Id.
See id. at 783.
252 Id. (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 62-5-101(1) (2009)).
250
251

Id. at 784 (citing Shaw v. Shaw, 182 S.E.2d 865 (S.C. 1971)).
Id. (citing Higgason v. Higgason, 516 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1973), overruled by
Dawley v. Dawley, 551 P.2d 323, 325 (Cal. 1976)); id. (citing In re Marriage of
Kutchins, 482 N.E. 1005 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)); id. (citing Boyd v. Edwards, 446
N.E.2d 1151 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982)); id. (citing Syno v. Syno, 594 A.2d 307 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1991)).
2

2"

255

Id.
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behalf.2 56 Mrs. Syno appealed on grounds that her husband could
not bring the action on his own behalf because of his status as
incompetent.25 7
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania noted that the
commonwealth's case law and statutes contained no authority for
distinguishing between incompetents who cannot manage their
finances and incompetents who cannot manage their personal
lives. Rather, once a person has been found incompetent for
either purpose, he or she is incompetent for all purposes.25 8
Accordingly, the superior court concluded that Mr. Syno could
not maintain an action for divorce in his own name, and the
judgment by the lower court granting the divorce was deemed
void. 25 9 However, following Higgason, the superior court held
that
an incompetent spouse should be permitted to institute a
divorce proceeding through a guardian or guardian ad litem,
provided the incompetent is capable of exercising reasonable
judgment as to personal decisions, understands the nature of
the action and is able to express unequivocally a desire to
dissolve the marriage.260
In addition, the superior court held that the incompetent
must be "able to verify statements made in his or her complaint"
and be "'competent' to testify."2 61 The superior court remanded
the case to the trial court for proceedings that would determine
whether Mr. Syno could satisfy these requirements, exercise
reasonable judgment, and express a clear desire for a divorce.26 2

Syno, 594 A.2d at 307.
Id. at 309.
'58 Id. at 310.
256
257
259

Id.

Id. at 311 (citing Higgason v. Higgason, 516 P.2d 289, 294-95 (1973),
overruled by Dawley v. Dawley, 551 P.2d 323, 325 (Cal. 1976)).
261 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Trudell, 538 A.2d 53 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)).
Regarding the husband's competence to testify, the superior court noted that "an
adjudicated incompetent may be 'competent' to testify." Id at 313. The standard for
this determination would be "whether the incompetent understands his or her duty
to tell the truth and whether he or she is able to perceive, remember and
communicate the pertinent facts." Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Goldblum, 447 A.2d
234 (Pa. 1982)).
262 Id. at 313-14.
260
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Northrop v. Northrop
This Delaware family court case concerns an elderly man
who filed for divorce in 1994.263 Several months later, two of the
couple's children filed a motion seeking to substitute themselves
for their father based on their allegation, supported by a
psychiatrist's affidavit, that their father was incompetent due to
Alzheimer's disease. In her responses, Mrs. Northrop suggested
that her husband lacked the capacity to prosecute the divorce
action, though she lacked sufficient knowledge to admit or deny
he had become "incompetent."2 6 To address this matter, the
Delaware trial court sought additional medical evidence
concerning Mr. Northrop's competence,26 5 citing, as its authority,
Hoffman v. Hoffman, a 1992 Delaware Supreme Court holding
that a family court "has statutory authority to determine the
mental competence of a spouse" before entering a divorce
decree.2 66
Hoffman had not established criteria for determining the
competence of a litigant in a divorce proceeding, but the Northrop
court noted that other jurisdictions had done so. 267 The Northrop
court also noted that one might be incompetent to manage one's
estate but be capable of making reasonable choices about one's
personal life. 2 68 "Thus, we should not deny per se an adjudicated
'incompetent' the right to proceed with a divorce action,"
concluded the Northrop court. 2 69 For a litigant to be found
"incompetent to initiate divorce proceedings," he or she must be
"[inicapable of exercising reasonable judgment as to personal
7.

decisions,

. .

. not understand the nature of the divorce action,

and [be] unable to express unequivocally a desire to dissolve the

"3 Northrop v. Northrop, File No. CN94-9882, Petition No. 1719-94, 1996 Del
Fam. Ct. LEXIS 96, at *1 (July 26, 1996).
264 Id. at *1-2.
265 Id. at *2-3.
2" Id. at *3 (citing Hoffman v. Hoffman, 616 A.2d 294 (Del. 1992)).
267 Id. at *3-4 (explaining that in one jurisdiction, the test is whether
petitioner
can "understand fully the meaning and effect of the petition and whether" he can
"determine in his own interest that he desires a final separation" (quoting In re
Marriage of Kutchins, 482 N.E.2d 1005, 1007 (Il. App. Ct. 1985))).
26 Id. at *4 ("[Aln individual who has been adjudicated 'incompetent' with
respect to management of his/her estate may be permitted to institute a divorce
proceeding through a guardian or guardian ad litem.").
269 Id. (quoting Syno v. Syno, 594 A.2d 307, 311 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)).
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marriage."270
Based on both parties' stipulation and the
psychiatrist's affidavit, the trial court found that Mr. Northrop
was "incompetent to pursue his divorce action."27 '
D. Analysis and Comment
The cases discussed in Part IV.C lead to certain conclusions
concerning the potential legitimacy of a specific "competence to
divorce" and of statutes that might recognize and implement
measures for courts to respond to litigants who appear to lack
this competence.
First, Shenk and Northrop found a specific state statutory
basis for allowing divorce courts to address and adjudicate the
competence of litigants. Though the statutes providing this
authority do not apply specifically to competence to divorce, these
decisions allow trial courts to make judgments about petitioners'
competence without distorting or liberally interpreting statutory
language.
Second, the decisions present diverse criteria concerning
competence to divorce and when competence is required. As
discussed above, the various criteria include:
* whether the divorce action reflects "the intelligent

*
*

exercise of the will or volition of the plaintiff," and
whether "that will or volition is expressed by a sane and
competent person"272
whether the petitioner can "exercis [e] a judgment, and
express[ I a wish, that the marriage be dissolved ... and
has done so"273 ;
whether the petitioner can express clear desires for
divorce, understand proceedings, exercise judgment, and
is competent to testify his or her wish for divorce 274

Id. at *5.
Id. A subsequent decision concluded that because Mr. Northrop had the
cognitive capacity to understand his actions and their consequences when he
initiated discussions about divorce proceedings (though perhaps not later on when
he signed the petition), he should be granted a divorce. See Northrop, 1996 Del Fam.
Ct. LEXIS 96, at *28-29.
272 Shenk v. Shenk, 135 N.E.2d 436, 439 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954).
213 Higgason v. Higgason, 516 P.2d 289, 294 (Cal. 1973), overruled by Dawley v.
Dawley, 551 P.2d 323, 325 (Cal. 1976).
274 See Boyd v. Edwards, 446 N.E.2d 1151, 1158-59 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982);
Murray v. Murray, 426 S.E.2d 781, 784 (S.C. 1993).
270

271
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* whether the petitioner can "understand fully the
meaning and effect of the petition and ... [can]
determine in his own interest that he desires a final
separation" 275; and
* whether the petitioner can "exercisle] reasonable
judgment as to personal decisions, understand[] the
nature of the action, . . . express unequivocally a desire

to dissolve the marriage,.. . verify statements made in
his or her complaint," and testify competently.27 6
Third, courts do not present a unitary scheme for reaching
conclusions about competence to divorce. In Syno, the superior
court insisted that the trial court make a determination of the
husband's competence from his own testimony, despite having a
detailed report prepared by a doctor who had examined the
husband in the case. 2 77 By contrast, in Northrop-which cited
Syno-a doctor's report was satisfactory support for a conclusion
of incompetence.m'
Fourth, the cases do not provide guidance about what
process is adequate for determining competence to divorce. Must
the putatively incompetent petitioner testify, or has he or she a
right not to do so? Is expert testimony required, or may lay
testimony suffice? If expert testimony is necessary, has the trial
court any authority to order a putatively incompetent petitioner
to undergo examination? Finally, what level of proof is required
to bar a petitioner from proceeding?
Finally, none of the cases provide a detailed rationale either
for concluding that petitioners must be competent, or for deciding
what particular capacities constitute competence for divorce.
Implicitly, some cases protect autonomy of petitioners by holding
that their competence for divorce may be retained despite having
a mental illness or a previous adjudication concerning
competence to manage one's person or estate. However, the cases
do not tell us why any minimum level of mental capacity should
be necessary for pursuing a divorce. Moreover, nothing in these
decisions would require other jurisdictions to see matters the

In re Marriage of Kutchins, 482 N.E.2d 1005, 1007 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
Syno v. Syno, 594 A.2d 307, 311 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); see also Northrop,
1996 Del Fam. Ct. LEXIS 96, at *4-5.
275
27

1" Syno, 594 A.2d at 312.
278 Northrop,

1996 Del Fam. Ct. LEXIS 96, at *4-5.
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same way, nor would these decisions inform courts about why
certain cognitive functions should or should not count in
determining competence to divorce.
The next two Parts describe ways to plug these gaps in case
law. We begin with the rationale for recognizing and requiring
specific competence to divorce.
A LEGAL RATIONALE
The merits of keeping individuals from making major, lifechanging decisions on the basis of their delusional beliefs seems
obvious, and this may be why some courts have imposed
competence requirements on divorce petitioners. But this raises
the question of why it might be desirable for courts to require
some form or level of competence before permitting an individual
to proceed with a divorce, especially when the very notion of
competence for divorce has drawn so little attention.
We
contend that two other areas of law where legal requirements for
competence are well established-competence to stand trial
("CST") and competence to consent to medical treatmentsuggest rationales for requiring individuals to satisfy some
competence requirement if they wish to divorce.
V.

A.

COMPETENCE FOR DIVORCE:

Competence To Stand Trial

1.

Historical Background
Within Anglo-American legal tradition, the expectation that
a criminal defendant be competent to stand trial dates back to at
least mid-seventeenth century England, 27 9 an era and setting in
which even persons who faced the severest penalties defended
themselves without legal counsel. The competence requirement
may have originated in response to defendants who stood "mute"
rather than enter a plea regarding guilt.28 0 By the time
Bruce J. Winick & Terry L. DeMeo, Competence To Stand Trial in Florida,35
U. MIAMI L. REV. 31, 32 n.2 (1980).
280 In such cases, juries decided whether the defendant was "obstinately mute, or
whether he be dumb ex visitatione Dei." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 319 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1769). A defendant found
"obstinately mute" was subjected to peine forte et dure, a procedure that continued
into the eighteenth century in which the defendant had increasingly heavy weights
placed on his chest until he answered or died. See id. at 335; 8 GROUP FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, MISUSE OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS:
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 887 (1974) (citing 2 NIGEL WALKER & SARAH
279
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Blackstone wrote his Commentaries, though, a defendant's
competence was deemed essential to the fairness of a criminal
trial.2 8 1 In Frith's Case, for example, after a jury found that a
mentally ill prisoner charged with treason was "quite insane,"
the prisoner was remanded and his trial was postponedperhaps indefinitely-until the prisoner might recover
sufficiently to defend himself.2 82 In charging the Frith jury, the
court invoked, as justification for requiring trial competence,
the humanity of the law of England falling into that which
common humanity, without any written law would suggest, has
prescribed, that no man shall be called upon to make his
defence at a time when his mind is in that situation as not to
appear capable of so doing. 283
2.

Standards
Though requiring defendants to be competent is a wellestablished feature of Anglo-American jurisprudence, courts and
legislatures have historically provided varying definitions of
CST. One of the judges in Frith instructed the jury to decide
whether the prisoner was "of sound mind and understanding or
not";284 if not, his trial would be delayed until "that season, when
by collecting together his intellects, and having them entire, he
shall be able so to model his defence as to ward off the
punishment of the law."8 Rex v. Pritchardarticulates an early
MCCABE, CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENGLAND (1968)). Those defendants who were

mute "by visitation of G[-Id" were spared this ordeal. Though this category originally
included just persons who could not speak or hear, it ultimately came to include
persons with mental illness. GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS
FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS

126 (3d. ed. 2007).
21 At common law, a "mad" defendant was "not to be arraigned .. . because he is
not able to plead to [the charge] with that advice and caution that he ought," nor was
he to be tried, "for how can he make his defense?" BLACKSTONE, supra note 280, at
24; see also 1 SIR MATHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 34
(Philadelphia, 1847).
22 R v. Frith, (1790) 22 Howell's St. Tr. 307. John Frith had attorneys who
asked for the postponement of the trial over their client's objection. Id. at 309. Frith
had already been locked up for three months and wished to proceed with his trial.
His charge of treason had arisen from his throwing a stone at the carriage of King
George III, after which authorities had immediately arrested him. Id. at 307-08.
' Id. at 318. There is no evidence that Frith ever was brought to trial. See
Richard Moran, The Originof Insanity as a Special Verdict: The Trial for Treason of
James Hadfield (1800), 19 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 487, 510 n.21 (1985).
' Frith,22 Howell's St. Tr. at 311 (quoting Judge Heath).
28 Id. at 318.
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and still frequently cited English formulation for judging CST,
directing a jury to consider, "[flirst, whether [a defendant] is
mute of malice or not; secondly, whether he can plead to the
indictment or not; thirdly, whether he is of sufficient intellect to
comprehend the course of proceedings on the trial."2 86
Looking at Pritchard and at current tests for adjudicative
fitness in Canada2 87 and Australia,2 8 8 one discerns a focus on
cognitive, factual understanding. American jurisdictions often go
a step further and consider the defendant's rationality. For
example, a New York state case from the mid-nineteenth century
held that a defendant was "sane" or competent for purposes of a
criminal trial if he "is capable of understanding the nature and
object of the proceedings going on against him; if he rightly
comprehends his own condition in reference to such proceedings,
and can conduct his defense in a rational manner."2 89
In an early twentieth century opinion, a U.S. federal appeals
court provided this test for CST: "Does the mental impairment of
the prisoner's mind, if such there be, whatever it is, disable
him ... from fairly presenting his defense, whatever it may be,
and make it unjust to go on with his trial at this time, or is he
feigning to be in that condition. . . ?"290 Another test asked trial

2e
R v. Pritchard, (1836) 7 Carrington & Payne 303, 304, 173 Eng. Rep. 135
(Oxford Cir.) (italics omitted).
2 Canadian courts followed Pritchard until 1992, see WADE RAAFLAUB,
PARLIAMENTARY INFORMATION & RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE LIBRARY OF

PARLIAMENT, THE MENTAL DISORDER PROVISIONS OF THE CRIMINAL CODE 1 (2005),

when the Canadian criminal code formally defined" 'unfit to stand trial'" as being
unable on account of mental disorder to conduct a defence at any stage of
the proceedings before a verdict is rendered or to instruct counsel to do so,
and, in particular, unable on account of mental disorder to (a) understand
the nature or object of the proceedings, (b) understand the possible
consequences of the proceedings, or (c) communicate with counsel.
Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 2 (2010).
m Though Australia continues to use the fitness criteria of Pritchard, its law
now further specifies that criminal defendants must have
the ability (1) to understand the nature of the charge; (2) to plead to the
charge and to exercise the right of challenge; (3) to understand the nature
of the proceedings, namely, that it is an inquiry as to whether the accused
committed the offence charged; (4) to follow the course of the proceedings;
(5) to understand the substantial effect of any evidence that may be given
in support of the prosecution; and (6) to make a defence or answer the
charge.
Kesavarajah v. R (1994) 181 C.L.R. 230, 243 (Austl.).
9 Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9, 24-25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1847).
o United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 289 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1906).
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courts whether the defendant was "capable of properly
appreciating his peril and of rationally assisting in his own
defense."2 9 ' Since the 1960s, all U.S. jurisdictions have come to
utilize CST standards that are consistent with Dusky v. United
States,29 2 in which the U.S. Supreme Court declared that a
criminal defendant may stand trial only if "he has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding" and "has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him."29
Although many state statutes contain definitions of competence
or incompetence to stand trial that do not mention rationality, 2 94
statutes or case law in at least eight states do.2 %
3.

Rationale
The requirement that defendants be competent to stand trial
evolved in times and contexts in which defendants were
precluded from retaining counsel in felony and treason cases. 9
Having defendants be competent was a means of protecting
accused individuals from unopposed action, like prosecution, by
the state. Since Gideon v. Wainwright's assurance of legal
United States v. Boylen, 41 F. Supp. 724, 725 (D. Or. 1941).
See Gerald Bennett, A Guided Tour Through Selected ABA Standards
Relating to Incompetence To Stand Trial, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 375, 376 (1985) ("In
considering the criteria for determining competence to stand trial, one must beginand indeed, end-with the criteria set forth in Dusky v. United States.").
293 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). In 1996, the Supreme
Court indicated that Dusky is a universal standard in the U.S. when it described
Dusky as providing the "well settled" standard for CST. See Cooper v. Oklahoma,
517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996). The Supreme Court views Dusky as specifying a minimum
CST standard: "States are free to adopt competency standards that are more
elaborate than the Dusky formulation, [though] the Due Process Clause does not
impose these additional requirements." Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993).
294 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.37(G) (LexisNexis 2010) (stating that
a defendant is incompetent if that individual cannot understand "the nature and
objective of the proceedings against" him or herself or assist in his or her defense).
2 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1367(a) (West 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 330.2020(1) (LexisNexis 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1001(a) (2009); see also
People v. Foley, 192 N.E.2d 850, 851 (Ill. 1963) (citing Withers v. People, 177 N.E.2d
203, 206 (Ill. 1961)) (stating that the test of CST is whether a defendant "can, in cooperation with his counsel, conduct his defense in a rational and reasonable
manner"). For an intriguing and useful discussion of the role of rationality in U.S.
interpretations of CST, see Grant H. Morris et al., Assessing Competency
Competently: Toward a Rational Standard for Competency-To-Stand-Trial
Assessments, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 231, 231-32, 241-42 (2004).
' See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932).
291
292
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counsel even for indigent criminal defendants, 297 being able to
mount a defense on one's own no longer provides a justification
for requiring defendants to be competent. Yet in the United
States, where availability of counsel is constitutionally
assured,29 8 the CST requirement has been seen as vital to the
criminal law. Among the justifications:
* The CST requirement is a mechanism for preventing an
innocent but mentally impaired defendant from being
wrongly convicted when he or she knew of exculpatory
facts but could not appreciate their significance and the
need to share them with counsel.2 9
* Having defendants be competent is a safeguard against
cruel treatment.oo
* "It is not 'due process of law' to subject an insane person
to trial upon an indictment involving liberty or life" and
would thus violate the U.S. Constitution. 301
A trial against an obviously psychotic or otherwise mentally
helpless defendant might appear unfair and might undermine
society's need to view its criminal justice system as reliable.
Such considerations underlie the Supreme Court's more recent
view that the CST requirement "is fundamental to an adversary
system of justice"3 0 2 and promotes fairness, accuracy, and

dignity. 3 03
Professor Richard Bonnie has emphasized that CST also has
a dimension that "derives from legal rules that establish that the
defendant must make or have the prerogative to make certain

See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
29 See United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 287 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1906); HENRY
WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 429-30 (1954).
1" See Jordan v. State, 135 S.W. 327, 328 (Tenn. 1911) ("It would be inhumane,
and to a certain extent a denial of the right of trial upon the merits, to require one
who has been disabled by the act of God from intelligently making his defense to
plead or be tried for his life or liberty.").
3o1 Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1899).
302 Drope v. Missouri., 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975).
30 See Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2387 (2008) (citing McKaskle v.
Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 168 (1984)) (noting that a pro se criminal defense does not
"affirm the dignity" of a defendant who lacks mental capacity to represent himself);
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 366-67 (1996) (citing Chisolm, 149 F. at 288);
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975) (asserting that a pro se defense
must not "abuse the dignity of the courtroom").
297

29"
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decisions regarding the defense or disposition of the case.
This "decisional competence" stems from a "norm of client
autonomy"30 5 or an implicit "principle of self-determination "3
that places the responsibilities for whether to plead guilty,30 7
whether to request a jury trial,os and whether to testify
squarely with the defendant. Further, when a defendant waives
constitutional rights, the trial court must make sure that the
defendant has done so knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily310-a further requirement that the defendant possess
some minimum level of rational cognitive capacity.
Professor Bonnie adds that, particularly now that criminal
defendants have guaranteed access to counsel, the CST
requirement reflects societal interests that are independent of
the implications for specific defendants.31 ' Bonnie summarizes
these interests as society's appropriate concern for the dignity of
criminal prosecutions. 3 12 For example, the right to a public trial,
but the lack of a corresponding right to a private trial,13 derives
from society's "independent interest in the pedagogical features
of criminal trials, especially jury trials. . . . [Plublic access to
and participation in criminal proceedings helps to assure
accountability of the judiciary and to effectuate democratic ideals
of self-governance." 3 14 Requiring a defendant's competence at the
time of trial or conviction ensures that punishment is imposed
only on persons who have "a meaningful moral understanding of
wrongdoing."1 Also independent of the defendant's interests is
society's interest in accuracy and in avoiding erroneous
convictions, which explains why a defendant does not have an

31' Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky
and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539, 553 (1993).
305 Id. (emphasis removed).
3" Id. at 554.
307 See, e.g., Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1966).
31 See, e.g., Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942).
30 See, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52-53 (1987) (quoting Harris v. New

York, 401 U.S. 222, 230 (1971)).
310 See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 397 (1993); Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (citing Adams, 317 U.S. at 279); id. (citing Johnson v. Zerbst,

304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938)); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
See Bonnie, supra note 304, at 543.
See id.
s See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia., 448 U.S. 555, 580-81 (1980).

3"

31

s1 Bonnie, supra note 304, at 544.
a Id. at 543.
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unqualified right to plead guilty.316 Finally, to prosecute someone
who "lacks a rudimentary understanding of the nature and
purpose of the proceedings ... offends the moral dignity of the
process because it treats the defendant not as an accountable
person, but as an object of the state's effort to carry out its
promises."317

B.

Competence To Consent to (orRefuse) Medical Treatment

1.

Historical Background
The requirement that physicians obtain consent from
patients before treating them has an ancient heritage in tort
law,3 18 where an intentional touching in the absence of consent
has long constituted a form of battery.3 19 Modern U.S. law has
greatly expanded physicians' obligations through the doctrine of
"informed consent." 20 Traditionally, a physician could avoid a
31
317
318

See id; see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.11 (1970).
Bonnie, supra note 304, at 551.

See, e.g., Slater v. Baker, (1767) 2 Wils. K.B. 363, 95 Eng. Rep. 860, 862
(K.B.) ("[A] patient should be told what is about to be done to him, [so] that he may
take courage and put himself in such a situation as to enable him to undergo the
operation."). A classic statement of this doctrine appears in U.S. law. Schloendorff v.
Soc'y of N.Y. Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) ("Every human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's
consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages."), superseded by
statute, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(1) (McKinney 2007).
319 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 28
(2001).
320 The phrase "informed consent" is widely believed to have first
appeared in
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., where it occurs in the context of
explaining the physician's duties:
A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability
if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an
intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment. Likewise the
physician may not minimize the known dangers of a procedure or operation
in order to induce his patient's consent. At the same time, the physician
must . .. recognize that each patient presents a separate problem, . . . and

that in discussing the element of risk a certain amount of discretion must
be employed consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an
informed consent.
317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957). Professor Katz suggests that this doctrine
appears to come "out of nowhere," but was in truth lifted from an amicus brief filed
by the American College of Physicians and Surgeons. Jay Katz, Reflections on
Informed Consent: 40 Years After Its Birth, 186 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 466, 468 (1998)
(citing American College of Surgeons, Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Defendant and Appellant Frank Gerbode (1956)). Concerning the distinction
between legal requirements for informed consent and the related philosophical
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successful action for battery if he had told his patient what the
proposed treatment was and had obtained the patient's
But under current informed consent
permission.3 21
requirements, physicians are expected to provide much more
information about a proposed treatment, including a description
of the treatment's risks, benefits, and the available alternatives,
including no treatment.32 2
Of course, a physician's comprehensive and conscientious
disclosure of information is useless unless the patient can
understand, think about, and apply what the physician is
explaining.3 2 3 Thus, the validity of informed consent is closely
tied to a patient's competence to make medical decisions.3 24
doctrine that has developed, see Armand Arabian, Informed Consent: From the
Ambivalence of Arato to the Thunder of Thor, 10 ISSUES L. & MED. 261, n.1 (1994).
321 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
32
190 n.59 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988) (noting that since 1960, negligence has come to
replace battery as the principle basis for liability in actions involving lack of
informed consent).
322 Salgo appears to be one of the first, if not the first, case to establish failure to
obtain consent as a matter of negligence. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Cal.
1972) (noting that courts were still "divided" and citing cases). The key cases
concerning the nature of disclosure are Natanson v. Kline, 354 P.2d 670 (Kan. 1960)
and Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Natanson established a
medical custom standard, holding that the required disclosures by the physician
must accord with "those which a reasonable medical practitioner would make under
the same or similar circumstances." 354 P.2d at 673. In Canterbury, however, the
court held that
the duty to disclose ... arises from phenomena apart from medical custom
and practice. . . [and must not be] dictated by the medical
profession .

. ..

The scope of the physician's communications to the patient,

then, must be measured by the patient's need, and ... the test for
determining whether a particular peril must be divulged is its materiality
to the patient's decision: all risks potentially affecting the decision must be
unmasked.
464 F.2d at 786-87. California quickly adopted Canterbury's "materiality" standard.
See Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 11. Subsequent California law has elaborated what
"material" means: the necessary information includes "reasonable disclosure of the
available choices with respect to proposed therapy lincluding nontreatment] and of
the dangers inherently and potentially involved in each." Thor v. Superior Court,
855 P.2d 375, 383 (Cal. 1993) (quoting Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 10). At present, the
physician disclosure standard is favored over the materiality standard by a slight
majority of U.S. jurisdictions. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 313-14 (2000).
2 See Demers v. Gerety, 515 P.2d 645, 649-50 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973) (stating
that a decision by an incompetent person is not a valid authorization for medical
treatment).
a2 It also is important that the consent be given voluntarily, that is, without
coercion, unfair persuasion, or inducement. See Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp.
1196, 1202 (D.C. 1974), vacated, 565 F.2d 722, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Lacking
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2.

Legal Standards
Concerning the legal standards for competence to make
medical decisions ("CMD"), two initial observations are
appropriate. First, although the requirement of competence
should be "neutral" as to whether a patient is agreeing with or
refusing recommended treatment, a patient's CMD is more likely
to be questioned and evaluated when the patient is declining
treatment that the physician recommends and believes is
necessary to prevent death or serious deterioration.3 2 5 Thus,
whatever contours the law has provided concerning CMD often
speaks to contexts in which a patient is refusing rather than
receiving treatment-the opposite of situations that led to case
law establishing information requirements for consent.3 26
A second observation follows from the first: the requirement
that patients be CMD often has the effect of preventing
individuals from harming themselves by rejecting needed care
because of their irrationality. Thus, in contrast to the law's CST
requirement-which in former times protected mentally
compromised individuals from being prosecuted when they could
not mount a defense-CMD often protects an individual from
himself. The CMD requirement assures that only those persons
who meet a certain standard can reject medical treatment
that their physicians believe they need.
Also, it assures
that the decisions that determine treatment are the patient's
own, and not merely those of the doctor.
Through the
CMD requirement, the patient is a self-governing collaborator in
care rather than a mere passive object of care.

voluntariness, a patient's agreement to treatment is at best acquiescence rather
than true consent. For an older but still useful formulation of the interrelationship
between competence, voluntariness, and informed consent, see Alan Meisel et al.,
Toward a Model of the Legal Doctrine of Informed Consent, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
285, 286-87 (1977).
325 See THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS
AND INSTRUMENTS 395 (2d ed. 2003) ("[Al patient whose decision creates a higher
level of risk regarding the patient's health is likely to receive greater scrutiny.");
Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency To Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 279, 281 (1977) ("[I]f patients do not decide the 'Wrong' way, the issue of
competency will probably not arise.").
326 For example, the plaintiffs in Canterbury and Natanson had both accepted
and undergone care that had suboptimal outcomes. See Canterbury,464 F.2d at 776;
Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1097.
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Legal standards concerning CMD are often left ill-defined in
case law, but, to the extent they have been articulated, those
standards follow a four-part scheme promulgated by psychiatrist
Paul Appelbaum and psychologist Thomas Grisso.117 Appelbaum
and Grisso construe CMD as having four component abilities:
(1) communicating
a choice, (2) understanding relevant
information, (3) appreciating one's situation and the relevant
likely consequences,
and (4) rational manipulation of
3
2
8
information.
Courts have often treated the ability to communicate a choice
as a necessary and perhaps self-evident feature of CMD.329 Were
this the only criterion for CMD, however, verbal patients could
make self-damaging choices even if they lacked any ability to
assimilate or rationally utilize information provided by
caregivers. Thus, when ability to express a choice appears in
case law, it usually does so accompanied by other elements of
CMD.

See Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Assessing Patients' Capacities To
Consent to Treatment, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1635, 1636-38 (1988); Jessica Wilen
Berg et al., Constructing Competence: Formulating Standards of Legal Competence
To Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 345, 351 (1996). For a recent
iteration of these ideas accompanied by practical examples of evaluation questions,
see Paul S. Appelbaum, Assessment of Patients' Competence to Consent to Treatment,
357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1834, 1835-36 (2007).
328 Appelbaum & Grisso, supra note 327, at 1635-36. This four-part scheme has
served as a key clinical heuristic where other types of competence are concerned.
See, e.g., NORMAN G. POYTHRESS ET AL., ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE: THE
MACARTHUR STUDIES 59-61 (2002) (applying the four-part scheme in CST context).
Missing from this four-part scheme is a feature suggested by Roth and colleagues:
whether the patient's decisionmaking reaches a "reasonable" outcome. Roth et al.,
supra note 325, at 280-81. The problem with this criterion relates to deciding what
is "reasonable." See Berg et al., supra note 327, at 352 n.22. However, this criterion
has received some support in older case law, see, e.g., United States v. George, 239 F.
Supp. 752, 753 (D. Conn. 1965), and "is probably used more often than might be
admitted by both physicians and courts." Roth et al., supra note 325, at 280-81.
Moreover, "unreasonable" choices are probably what trigger many investigations of
CMD, even though the matters may ultimately be judged on other grounds.
3
See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (Ill. 1989)
("Obviously, a patient who is irreversibly comatose . .. will be incompetent, unable
to communicate his intent."); Morgan v. Olds, 417 N.W.2d 232, 235 (Iowa Ct. App.
1987) (noting that in some cases, patients are incompetent "as the result of being
comatose" and are unable to make decisions).
327
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An ability to understand information is the feature of CMD
most commonly identified by courts330 and legislatures.33 ' Berg
and colleagues suggest that when used in this context,
understanding should be regarded narrowly: simply as a capacity
to assimilate or comprehend facts and statements about proposed
care that are communicated by caregivers.33
Distinct from the capacity to understand information is the
ability to appreciate what that information means in one's own
situation. Appreciation involves recognition by a patient that
information supplied by caregivers applies to him. 3 3 Thus, a
psychotic individual who understands and can repeat what his
physician has told him about antipsychotic medication, but who
refuses the drugs because he flatly denieS334 that he is mentally
ill, is incapable of appreciating-or properly evaluating-the
information he has received and its relevance to his situation."5
330 See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 683 (Ariz. 1987)
("[The
patient must have a clear understanding of the risks and benefits of the proposed
treatment alternatives or nontreatment, along with a full understanding of the
nature of the disease and the prognosis."); Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d 427, 431 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1994); Miller v. Rhode Island Hosp., 625 A.2d 778, 786 (R.I. 1993); Virgil
D. v. Rock County, 524 N.W.2d 894, 898 (Wis. 1994).
331 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4503 (2010) (declaring that "[any person of
ordinary intelligence and awareness sufficient for him or her generally to
comprehend the need for, the nature of and the significant risks ordinarily inherent
in [any proposed care] is competent to consent thereto"); see also WIs. STAT.
§ 51.61(1)(g)(4) (2009) (providing that "an individual is not competent to refuse
medication or treatment if, [following an explanation of proposed treatment and
alternatives] . . . [tihe individual is incapable of expressing an understanding of the
advantages and disadvantages of accepting medication or treatment and the
alternatives"). Implicit in this Wisconsin provision is that the individual's grasp of
information can be evaluated only through some outward display of understanding.
332 Berg et al., supra note 327, at 353-54.
Saks and Jeste suggest a slightly different articulation of this distinction:
"[U]nderstanding refers to comprehension of the meaning of the information given
one about the treatment .. . whereas appreciation refers to the beliefs one has
formed about that information." Elyn R. Saks & Dilip V. Jeste, Capacity To Consent
to or Refuse Treatment and/or Research: Theoretical Considerations,24 BEHAV. Sc.
& L. 411, 414 (2006).
3
Here, we recognize that doctors can make mistakes and allow that reasonable
disagreements can form the basis of a valid treatment refusal. Thus, a patient who
says, "My doctor is sure that I need antidepressants, but I think I can manage my
problems without them" has recognized and appreciated the applicability of the
doctor's judgments. By contrast, a patient who says, "The doctor says I am mentally
ill and need medication, but that's baloney; my problem is that I have an electronic
monitoring device in my brain" cannot apply the doctor's assessment because of
adherence to a delusional belief.
" See, e.g., Guardianship of Roe, 583 N.E.2d 1282, 1286 (Mass. 1992) (affirming
judgment of incompetence of a man with schizophrenia because he denied that he
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On the other hand, a psychotic individual may hold several
delusional beliefs, yet be recognized as competent to refuse
medical care if the delusions do not prevent him from grasping
the significance of the information he has received and its
implications for his condition."3
Rational manipulation of information is the fourth feature of
CMD under Appelbaum and Grisso's formulation. This criterion
looks to whether a patient can engage in and demonstrate logical
thought processes when comparing risks and benefits of
treatment options. Berg and colleagues note that of the four
CMD-related capacities, rational manipulation "is the ability
least often included in legal competence standards,"s3 in part
because it is "the hardest to operationalize,"" and in part
because courts may be reluctant to make judgments about what

is and is not rational. 33 9
was mentally ill and thus could not "appreciate the need to control this illness with
antipsychotic medication" or "the risks associated with refusing it").
3
See, e.g., In re Milton, 505 N.E.2d 255, 256 & n.2, 260 (Ohio 1987) (upholding
delusional psychiatric patient's right to refuse radiation therapy for uterine cancer
because such treatment would conflict with her belief in faith healing and her "belief
in spiritual healing stands on its own, without regard to any delusion"), overruled in
part by Steele v. Hamilton County Cmty. Mental Health Bd., 736 N.E.2d 10 (Ohio
2000).
" Berg et al., supra note 327, at 357. For example, Illinois's health care
surrogate law requires "decisional capacity," defined as "the ability to understand
and appreciate the nature and consequences of a decision regarding medical
treatment or forgoing life-sustaining treatment and the ability to reach and
communicate an informed decision." 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/10 (LexisNexis 2010).
Interestingly, though, its mental health treatment preference statute requires
rationality: There, someone lacks decisional capacity if, "in the opinion of 2
physicians or the court, [that] person's ability to receive and evaluate information
effectively or communicate decisions" is sufficiently impaired. Id. 43/5(5).
' Berg et al., supra note 327, at 357. Berg and colleagues apparently use
"operationalize" as the term is used in the social sciences, where to "operationalize" a
concept, one must define it so as to make it measurable through observations of
specific, objective variables.
" The facts in In re Milton provide an example: In holding that Ms. Milton's
belief in faith healing, even if unwise or foolish, could be overridden only if the belief
threatened paramount interests, the Ohio Supreme Court failed to recognize or
examine ways that her delusion of being married to a faith healer might be affecting
her decision to refuse radiation therapy. 505 N.E.2d at 258-59; see also In re Yetter,
62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619, 621-24 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1973) (finding a delusional sixty-year-old
woman competent to decline mastectomy to treat breast cancer, though her refusal
was based on concern about how the surgery would affect her non-existent
Hollywood career). Courts do not always respect patients' viewpoints, however. See,
e.g., In re Harvey U., 116 A.D.2d 351, 353, 501 N.Y.S.2d 920, 921-22 (3d Dep't 1986)
(holding that "irrational trust" in the natural healing of a patient's illness and the
belief that hospitalization was for experimental purposes supported finding that
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Nonetheless, rational manipulation or use of rational
thought processes is a feature of many statutory definitions of
CMD. In Alaska, for example, rational manipulation appears in
the state's mental health statute, under which a "competent"
psychiatric patient:
(A) has the capacity to assimilate relevant facts and to
appreciate and understand [his or her] situation with regard to
those facts .. .;
(B) appreciates that [he or she] has a mental disorder or
impairment, if the evidence so indicates ..

.;

(C) has the capacity to participate in treatment decisions by
means of a rational thought process; and
(D) is able to articulate reasonable objections to using the
offered medication. 340
3.

Rationale

These four criteria do not look directly at the outcome of a
decision. Rather, communication, understanding, appreciation,
and rational manipulation of information focus on a patient's
thinking and decisionmaking processes and his or her
A patient who can understand and
articulation thereof.
appreciate information, think logically about his or her situation,
and communicate his or her decision is competent and should
have his or her decision respected even if the decision seems
wrong to nearly everyone. Thus, the four criteria give life to
Justice Brandeis's oft-quoted sentiment: "The makers of our
Constitution ... sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They
conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alonethe most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by

civilized men."3 4 1
patient was not competent), rev'd, Veteran's Admin. Med. Ctr. v. Harvey U., 68
N.Y.2d 624, 496 N.E.2d 229, 505 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1986).
340 ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.837(d)(1) (2010). The statute also notes, in connection
with the ability to appreciate one's illness, that "denial of a significantly disabling
disorder or impairment, when faced with substantial evidence of its existence,
constitutes evidence that the patient lacks the capability to make mental health
treatment decisions." Id.
341 Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967). This
notion has frequently arisen in connection with refusal of treatment on religious
grounds. See, e.g., In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435, 436, 442-43 (Ill. 1965)
(holding that a Jehovah's Witness had a First Amendment right to refuse blood
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The legal and ethical doctrine of informed consent in medical
decisionmaking reflects a paramount respect for selfdetermination, that is, the individual's right to define personal
goals and make decisions to achieve goals.3 42 Case law and
statutes concerning informed consent encourage physicians and
other caregivers to make disclosures to patients and to refrain
from providing care until patients give consent.3 43 Rulings and
statutes also have an "educative role": They reinforce respect
for self-determination,
in a context where ever-increasing
knowledge and expertise of caregivers might encourage a "doctor
knows best" approach to healthcare decisions.4
At the same time, the exceptions to informed consentincluding the exception for individuals who lack CMD-implicitly
acknowledge that other ends, including the promotion of wellbeing and protection of life, exert a countervailing influence
within doctor-patient relationships. 3 46 The idea that patients are
better off when they participate in making choices about their
medical care is based partly in moral principle-respect for
autonomy-and partly in empirical reality.3 47 Some patients
clearly cannot benefit morally or practically from selfdetermination. 3 48 To allow persons suffering from debilitating
mental illnesses to refuse needed medical treatment could harm
or kill them and might thereby frustrate their long-term rational
values and aims. 34 9 By making competence a requirement for
medical decision making, society, through the law, enhances
everyone's well-being.3 0 The competence requirement protects
all of us from harms we might suffer were we to become disabled
by defects in our decisionmaking capacities. In a sense, then,
requiring CMD is a general advance directive, executed not by
transfusions); In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 405 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that the
state may not override pregnant mother's religion-based refusal of transfusion).
"4 PRESIDENTS COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAIKING HEALTH CARE
DECISIONS 17 (1982) [hereinafter ETHICAL PROBLEMS].
" See id. at 30.
3
Id.
36 For a bold statement of this position, see Franz J. Ingelfinger, Arrogance, 303
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1507 (1980).
- See ETHICAL PROBLEMS, supra note 342.
3
See id. at 56.
* See id.
3
See id. at 56-57.
35 See id.

HeinOnline -- 84 St. John's L. Rev. 178 2010

2010)

INCOMPETENTDIVORCE

179

individuals but by civil society on behalf of all its members.
Requiring CMD ultimately serves as an autonomy- and freedomenhancing feature of the law and is justifiable on Rawlsian
grounds: It is appropriate to ignore or override the medical
choices of incompetent persons because all rational people,
knowing in advance that they could suffer a loss of their
decisionmaking capacity, would desire a mechanism for such
protection.as1
D. Implications:Rationalesfor Competence To Divorce

The legal standards, traditional bases, and rationales for
requiring competence of criminal defendants and individuals who
decline health-restoring or live-saving treatment provide clear
hints about the rationales that would support a legal
requirement of competence for divorcing individuals and legal
criteria that would give effect to that requirement. In the next
Part, we propose a legal standard for competence to divorce along
with inquiries that might help courts, aided by input from mental
health professionals, adjudicate the matter. We conclude this
Part with a set of rationales that support legal provisions that
would bar from participating in divorce proceedings individuals
whose judgment is severely impaired by active symptoms of
mental illness.
Protection of the Mentally Ill Litigant
As discussed above, one of early justifications of requiring
competence for criminal defendants was their potential need to
defend themselves without the assistance of counsel. Though
attorneys are now made available to criminal defendants who
cannot afford counsel, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently
affirmed the legal system's ongoing concern for and obligation to
protect defendants who might wish to proceed pro se.352 In
divorce proceedings, litigants have no constitutional guarantee of
1.

351 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 218-19 (Belknap Press rev. ed. 1999)
(1971) (contending that a belief in liberty is consistent with paternalistic protections
for the "mentally disturbed").
352 See Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2386-87 (2008) (discussing the
impact of severe psychopathology, and concluding that allowing pro se defense by
someone "unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense
without the help of counsel . .. is at least as likely to prove humiliating as
ennobling" and would preclude a fair trial).
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counsel.3 53 This leaves open the possibility that a vulnerable
mentally ill individual seeking divorce for delusional reasons
might not only initiate a potentially harmful divorce action but
might make additional self-harming judgments in the course of
litigation.
Even if the mentally impaired litigant has retained counsel,
divorce proceedings may still require the separating parties to
make complex decisions, for example, when substantial assets
are involved or decisions with major consequences for a litigant's
own future situation or the situation of loved ones.35 4 Depending
on the content and force of their delusions, individuals with
psychotic disorders may find themselves motivated by irrational,
but nonetheless intense, fears or desires. Yet they may not heed
the advice of counsel because their illness impairs their ability to
recognize that their fears are false or to appreciate that their
decisions are foolish.35 5
2.

Deleterious Consequences of Divorce
Even when the parties do not suffer from capacitycompromising psychiatric illnesses, divorce litigants are
statistically likely to suffer adverse consequences. Women and
their children are likely to be financially worse off after a divorce,
and although the results are more mixed for men, many of them

a The internet has scores or perhaps hundreds of websites aimed at helping
individuals initiate divorce actions on their own and inexpensively. See, e.g.,
3StepDivorce, http://www.3stepdivorce.com/index.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2010);
CompleteCase, http-//www.completecase.com/index.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2010);
LegalZoom,
http://www.legalzoom.com/1egal-divorce/divorce-overview.html
(last
visited Apr. 15, 2010). Many jurisdictions provide government-sanctioned help with
initiating divorce. For example, the State of New York maintains a website
that "offers free instruction booklets and forms for people starting a divorce." New
York State Unified Court System, Matrimonial Matters, http://www.nycourts.
gov/ip/matrimonial-matters/forms.shtml (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
S
Such considerations underlie the majority rule that a guardian may not bring
a suit for divorce on behalf of an incompetent individual. See supra Part IV.B.
"I See H. Richard Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger, Mental Health Courts as a Way
To Provide Treatment to Violent Persons with Severe Mental Illness, 300 JAMA 722,
722 (2008) ("[Slome individuals with mental illness have anosognosia, a biologically
based inability to recognize that one has a mental illness."); see also Lorenzo Pia &
Marco Tamietto, Unawareness in Schizophrenia: Neuropsychological and
NeuroanatomicalFindings, 60 PSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 531, 53234 (2006) (describing defects in frontal lobe functioning and other possible
neuroanatomical bases for lack of insight into one's own mental illness).
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wind up as financial "losers" too.356 Divorced women experience
an increased risk for cardiovascular disease that persists well
into middle age.'
Marriage is unambiguously beneficial to
men's health: Never-married men have mortality rates 250%
higher than married men.3 58 Studies across various cultures and
times have shown that married persons live longer than persons
who are divorced, widowed, or single.35 9 Finally, cross-section
and longitudinal studies show that married individuals
experience lower rates of depression, anxiety, and other
psychiatric disorders than do persons who are single, widowed, or
divorced.eo
Though these findings may in part reflect better emotional
and physical health of persons who get and stay married, a
variety of factors suggest that divorce may cause health
problems. Divorce is a highly stressful event, and it often is
accompanied or followed by other stressors: lowered living
standards, residence changes, disrupted social networks and
356 Patricia A. McManus & Thomas A. DiPrete, Losers and Winners: The
FinancialConsequences of Separation and Divorce for Men, 66 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL
REV. 246, 265-66 (2001) (noting that "women and children ... overwhelmingly
suffer serious declines in their material well-being in the aftermath of separation
and divorce" and that "men's economic outcomes following separation and divorce
are heterogeneous, with a majority of losers but a sizable core of winners"). This is
an international phenomenon. See, e.g., Caroline Dewilde & Wilfred Uunk,
Remarriageas a Way To Overcome the FinancialConsequences of Divorce-A Test of
the Economic Need Hypothesis for European Women, 24 EUR. SOCIOLOGICAL REV.
393, 393 (2008) (citing studies that find that, for women, divorce "results in a
substantial decline of household income and an increased likelihood of falling into
poverty").
3 See Zhenmei Zhang & Mark D. Hayward, Gender, the Marital Life Course,
and CardiovascularDisease in Late Midlife, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 639, 653-54
(2006) (noting that following divorce, women have a higher risk of cardiovascular
disease in late midlife compared to continuously married women, which can be
explained by higher emotional distress and a fall in socioeconomic status).
* See Catherine E. Ross et al., The Impact of the Family on Health: The Decade
in Review, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1059, 1061 (1990).
3 See, e.g., Yuanreng Hu & Noreen Goldman, Mortality Differentials by Marital
Status: An International Comparison, 27 DEMOGRAPHY 233, 246 (1990); Lee A.
Lillard & Linda J. Waite, 'Til Death Do Us Part:MaritalDisruption and Mortality,
100 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1131, 1152-55 (1995).
360 See Anne E. Barrett, Marital Trajectories and Mental Health, 41 J. HEALTH
& Soc. BEHAV. 451, 460 (2000) (finding that marriage benefits one's mental health
and leads to a lower risk of anxiety and substance abuse); Sheila R. Cotten, Marital
Status and Mental Health Revisited: Examining the Importance of Risk Factorsand
Resources, 48 FAM. RELATIONS 225, 225, 231-32 (1999) (observing that married
individuals experience a lower risk of depression and greater psychological resources
such as self-esteem and mastery).
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social support, and single parenting. 361 A variety of studies
suggest that declines in health may result from stress-related
changes in the release of pituitary hormones, adrenal hormones,
and proinflammatory cytokines, which are associated with
cardiovascular disease." Stress can also increase the likelihood
of unhealthy behavior patterns, such as smoking and
overeating. 3 Given what we know about the adverse mental
and physical impact of divorce, it makes sense for society to bar
this option when individuals are acting for reasons that are
clearly symptoms of a severe mental illness.
3.

Dignity and Integrity of Legal Processes
As noted above, courts cite society's interest in the dignity of
criminal proceedings as a justification for requiring defendants to
be competent to stand trial. Divorce hearings and trials usually
do not receive much publicity, and,unlike criminal proceedings,3 64
they do not function as public expressions of society's attitudes or
moral response to certain types of behavior.6 Yet society has a
far-from-trivial interest in protecting the dignity and seriousness
of all legal processes, including those processes that lead to
termination of marriages.36 6
Dignity of legal processes was one of the rationales behind
the development of no-fault divorce laws. Previously, lawyers
often advised clients who wished to divorce about how to create

361

See Zhang & Hayward, supra note 353, at 641.

362 See id.

* See id.

"Determining the truth about guilt and innocence, however, is not the sole
purpose of a trial. The trial is also a public performance, an opportunity for the
community to witness and absorb a morality tale about crime and punishment and
thereby to learn the values of the society." Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Trial?:
PresidentBush Asks Congress To Authorize Military Commissions, FINDLAW, Sept.
20, 2006, http://writ,news.findlaw.com/colb/20060920.html. For a discussion of
Kantian morality as the only sensible basis for prosecuting war crimes, see Aaron
Fichtelberg, Crimes Beyond Justice? Retributivism and War Crimes, 24 CRIM. JUST.
ETHICS 31, 32 (2005).
3
The classic articulation of this notion is in Joel Feinberg, The Expressive
Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING 95, 97-100 (1970).
* In acknowledgment of the seriousness of divorce, South Carolina requires its
courts of domestic relations to "make an earnest effort to bring about a
reconciliation," and no divorce may be granted by a judge unless he states "in the
[divorce] decree that he has attempted to reconcile the parties to such action and
that such efforts were unavailing." S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-90 (2009).
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evidence that courts would accept.36 7 In many states, the most
popular allegation for divorce was "cruelty."
Wives would
regularly testify that their husbands treated them miserably. As
a California Supreme Court justice characterized the situation:
Every day, in every superior court in the state, the same
melancholy charade was played: the "innocent" spouse,
generally the wife, would take the stand and, to the
accompanying cacophony of sobbing and nose-blowing, testify
under the deft guidance of an attorney to the spousal conduct
that she deemed "cruel."3 8
No-fault divorce was seen as a solution to a situation in
which widely acknowledged lying and collusion threatened the
dignity and integrity of legal proceedings.3 9 Although it is not
perjury when a litigant files documents or testifies about matters
that he sincerely but delusionally believes are true, the dignity
and honesty of legal proceeding is implicated when the court
knows that the initiating party to divorce is acting for completely
false reasons. Moreover, the dignity of legal proceedings can be
abused by mentally ill persons who use legal mechanisms to
pursue delusional ideas.
4.

Therapeutic Jurisprudence

In recent years, "therapeutic jurisprudence" has recognized
that the law is a social force that shapes behavior by imposing
consequences and can potentially serve as a therapeutic or antitherapeutic agent.7 0
While proponents of therapeutic
jurisprudence insist that their scholarly approach is not an effort

36
Our personal favorite, termed "collusive adultery," required both sides to
agree that the wife would "surprise" her husband at home and discover him
committing adultery with a "mistress" hired for this purpose. The wife would swear
falsely to the "facts" and the husband would admit them, which was tantamount to
both sides committing perjury. The husband's "conviction" for adultery provided the
judge with grounds for divorce. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE
20TH CENTURY 436 (2002).
a McKim v. McKim, 493 P.2d 868, 875 (Cal. 1972) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
369 See Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991
BYU L. REV. 79, 93; see also Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California'sNo-Fault
Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 291, 297-98 (1987) (noting statistics that suggest that
most divorces for which the putative cause was "extreme cruelty" actually reflected
parties' mutual consent).
370 See DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN THE THERAPEUTIC KEY:
DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE xvii (1996).
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to subvert other important legal values, 7 they urge that
therapeutic impact be one factor that courts, attorneys, and other
legal actors consider as they create and carry out legal policy.
Clearly, absent some overriding reason to the contrary, the law
should not implicitly sanction, foster, or promote a mentally ill
person's acting on his delusions when such action has potentially
serious consequences for him or others he affects.
5.

Self-Determination
Self-determination, or vindication of autonomy, has, as
demonstrated above, served as a justification for no-fault divorce
and as the basis for allowing individuals to refuse recommended
medical treatment. In the latter case, requiring competence is a
complement to self-determination: it functions as an implicit,
general advance directive that expresses one's freedom, and it
serves as a mechanism for preserving one's safety and
opportunity for future self-expression when mental disability
might otherwise leave one imperiled. If the availability of nofault divorce can be seen as an advance3 72 in self-determination,
requiring competence of divorcing parties has a similar role in
complementing autonomy. In requiring competence at the time
of divorce, the law would provide a safeguard that rational
individuals would desire as a means of protecting themselves and
their loved ones from being harmed by choices impaired by and
arising from their mental illnesses.

"7 They note, for example, that therapeutic considerations do not, by
themselves, justify coercion. Id.
372 Whether this and similar developments in family law represent an "advance"
in the melioristic sense has been the subject of scholarly, as well as public, debate.
See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE 105-08 (1989)
(emphasisizing that individuality ignores the reality of interdependence, especially
dependence of children on caretakers); Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the
Transformation of Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1809-16 (1985) (contending
that legal changes, including no-fault divorce, reflect diminished moral discourse).
" In a similar vein, Saks and Jeste state:
An incompetently made choice is, in an important sense, not an
autonomous choice. The choice may well not reflect the chooser's goals or
values. If those goals or values represent the core of the person, then a
choice that fails to serve them is, in a sense, not the chooser's choice, and is
therefore not reflective of the core of the person. It is not his or her choice.
Saks & Jeste, supra note 333, at 412.
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6.

Lack of Countervailing Value
Finally, we recognize that persons might raise objections or
counterarguments to several of the preceding rationales for
requiring competence of divorcing parties. As a final point, then,
we note that there is little countervailing value to allowing
someone to divorce when his reason is one he would not hold
were he not suffering from a serious mental illness.
VI. A MODEL STATUTE

Because the aim of divorce proceedings is to produce an
agreement dissolving the marriage, one might regard those
competence standards pertaining to formation and enforcement
of contracts as the best source for guidance concerning
competence to maintain a divorce action. Traditionally, the law
has recognized immaturity, 374 mental disorders-including
substance-related conditions-and mental retardation as bases
for invalidating contracts. The test for competence has referred
to the person's "ability to understand in a meaningful way, at the
time the contract is executed, the nature, scope and effect of the
contract;" 37 5 incompetence to contract occurs if "the powers of a
person's mind have been so affected as to destroy the ability to
understand the nature of the act in which he is engaged, its scope
and effect or its nature and consequences."376
These tests focus primarily on the individual's cognitive
grasp of the transaction.
While there may be valid policy
reasons for constructing the laws of contract along these lines,378
the strictly cognitive emphasis would fail to recognize and avert
the devastating impairments discussed in Part III, which induce
delusional motivations in individuals, while preserving their
31
Formerly defined as an age less than twenty-one years old, now it is an age
below eighteen years. See 1 E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS
443-45 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter FARNSWORTH].
31
Gaddy v. Douglas, 597 S.E.2d 12, 20 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004).
3" Davis v. Marshall, No. 94APE02-158, 1994 WL 425169, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
1994).
3" But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(l)(b) (1981) (proposing
that a contract is invalid "if by reason of mental illness or defect [the individual] is
unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the transaction, and the other
party has reason to know of his condition").
37 Farnsworth suggests that a "case-by-case analysis of incompetency may be
too costly and too productive of uncertainty," and that "[a]rbitrary rules may be
suited" to society's needs for reliable business transactions. FARNSWORTH, supra
note 374, at 443.
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capacity to act on those delusions. Also, contract law requires
certain efficiencies that are unnecessary and even unwise in
divorce cases. Contracts between individuals usually are created
without the supervision or approval of an independent legal
authority, and the demands of commercial transactions require
clear-cut rules that can be implemented reliably, quickly, and
automatically. In divorce cases, a court must approve the final
settlement, and the existence of special courts of domestic
relations attests to the law's recognition of how divorce may
affect family ties that society wishes to foster. The duration of
and individual judicial attention offered during many divorce
proceedings provide opportunities and a framework for requiring
competence to pursue a divorce and for undertaking assessments
when competence is questioned."
A.

Text of a Model Statute

Accordingly, we propose the following model statute ("Model
Statute") on competence to maintain a divorce action, which
utilizes elements of existing statutes concerning competence to
stand trial and to make treatment decisions. *
Model Statute
1. Presumption and Definitions
1.1 For purposes of this section, "competent" means
"competent to initiate, maintain, and participate in divorce
proceedings," and "competence" refers to being competent to
initiate, maintain, and participate in divorce proceedings.
1.2 Parties to a divorce action are presumed to be
competent.3 81
.. See Beck & Frost I, supra note 6, at 25 (offering a similar argument
concerning competence to mediate a divorce settlement).
380 We have modeled our proposal on existing laws in Ohio and Alaska: Ohio's
statutory provisions concerning competence to stand trial, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2945.37-.38 (LexisNexis 2010); and Alaska's statutes concerning informed
consent for and capacity to make treatment decisions concerning psychotropic
medications, ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.30.836-.837 (2010). This adaptation of adopting
laws that have proven workable for courts should provide some assurance of our
proposal's appropriateness and practicability in the contexts we address in this
Article.
381 This presumption is consistent with other areas of law governing competence.
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 601 ("Every person is competent to be a witness . . . ."); GA.
CODE ANN. § 53-4-10(a) (2010) ("Every individual 14 years of age or older may make
a will, unless laboring under some legal disability... ."); 01o REV. CODE ANN.
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1.3 A party is competent if that party: 382
1.3.1 can express a clear, consistent preference as to
whether to divorce;
1.3.2 can assimilate and understand relevant facts
and the
proceedings
the divorce
concerning
consequences of the proceedings;
1.3.3 can appreciate the party's situation with regard to
those facts;
1.3.4 can participate in the divorce proceedings using
rational thought processes;
1.3.5 can provide and does articulate reality-based
reasons for seeking or pursuing a divorce and for
wishing to participate in divorce proceedings.
1.4 Attitudes, Beliefs, and Competence 383
1.4.1 The following are not, by themselves, evidence of
lacking competence:
1.4.1.1 plausible but inaccurate perceptions of the
spouse;
1.4.1.2 callousness or bitterness toward the spouse;
1.4.1.3 seeking a divorce for seemingly petty, trivial,
or ill-considered reasons;
1.4.1.4 seeking a divorce despite the party's best
interests or the interests of loved ones;
1.4.1.5 having a mental disorder or mental illness.
1.4.2 Any party's holding of patently false beliefs
directly related to seeking or as reasons for seeking a
divorce constitutes rebuttable evidence that the party is
not competent.
1.5 "Evaluee" means a party that the court has ordered to
undergo an examination concerning competence, as
described in Section 3, below.
1.6 In enacting this Section, the legislature specifically
recognizes that individuals seek to divorce for reasons that
are callous, mean-spirited, ill-considered, stupid, selfcentered, trivial, or contrary to their own best interests
and/or the interests of their loved ones. The legislature does

§ 2945.37(G) (LexisNexis 2010) (stating the presumption of competence to stand
trial).
382This subsection parallels the Alaska statute's implementation of the fourpart Appelbaum-Grisso standard discussed supra notes 327-339 and accompanying
text.
3 We discuss the rationale for this section infra text accompanying notes 390397.
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not intend to bar an individual from obtaining a divorce
simply because it was initiated under such circumstances.
2. Hearings3
2.1 In a divorce action in the court of domestic relations, the
court or either party may raise the issue of a party's
competence. If the court finds probable cause to believe that
a party is not competent, the court shall hold a hearing on
the issue as provided in this section.
2.2 Either party may submit evidence relevant to the party's
questioned competence. A written report of a medical or
psychological evaluation of the party may be admitted into
evidence at the hearing by stipulation, but if either party
objects to its admission, the report may be admitted under
sections [applicable statute or rule on expert evidence].
2.3 The court shall not find a party incompetent solely
because the party has a mental disorder or mental illness.
The court shall not find a party incompetent solely because
the party is receiving or has received psychotropic
medication or other forms of psychiatric or psychological
treatment, even if the party might become incompetent
without such treatment.

2.4 If, after a hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of
the evidence that, because of the party's present mental
condition, the party is not competent as defined in Section
1.3, the court shall do one of the following:
2.4.1 dismiss the divorce petition;
* Sections 2 and 3 create mechanisms for a court of domestic relations to
inquire into a party's competence to divorce; the sections also give the court
authority and powers to require (or compel) a possibly incompetent party to undergo
evaluation to aid the court in determining whether the party is competent. This
authority parallels the authority available to criminal courts when the question of
trial competence arises. This latter authority arises both from statutes, see, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.38, and from case law, see,
e.g., Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354-55, 368 (1996); Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715, 720, 730-31 (1972); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402-03 (1960),
that have established competence at the time of trial as a Constitutional protection.
The existence of cases cited in Part IV.B. suggests that domestic relations courts
have assumed they may have similar powers; at the very least, domestic relations
courts have established powers to bar divorce for some individuals, perhaps on the
same grounds that have allowed these courts to bar divorces of individuals
previously adjudicated incompetent. See cases cited supra notes 198-202. To our
knowledge, however, neither statute nor case law has clearly established any
authority to request mental examinations of parties suspected of incompetence to
divorce, to incentivize parties-through legal compulsion or staying proceedings-to
submit to examinations, or to act upon the results of such examinations by
dismissing or staying proceedings.
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2.4.2 issue an order staying any divorce proceedings for
up to one year pending the outcome of a course of
treatment aimed at restoring the party's competence.
2.5 If the court has ordered treatment as provided in Section
2.4.2, the court shall hold hearings at intervals not to exceed
six months, and in all cases at the end of one year following
issuance of the treatment order. At these hearings, the
court shall receive evidence relevant to whether the party
At the conclusion of such a
has regained competence.
hearing:
2.5.1 if the court finds that the party has regained
competence, the court shall issue an order lifting the
stay;
2.5.2 if the court finds that the party has not regained
competence, but one year has not elapsed since the
order issued pursuant to Section 2.4.2, the court shall
continue the hearing;
2.5.3 if the court finds that the party has not regained
competence, and one year has elapsed since the order
pursuant to Section 2.4.2, the court shall dismiss the
divorce petition.
2.6 No person whose divorce petition has been dismissed
pursuant to Sections 2.4.1 or 2.5.3 may submit a new
divorce petition unless one year has elapsed since the
dismissal.
3. Examination by Court Order
3.1 If the issue of a party's competence is raised, the court
may order one or more evaluations of the party's present
An examiner shall conduct the
mental condition.
evaluation. "Examiner" means either of the following:
3.1.1 a psychiatrist who is licensed to practice medicine
in this state and who is eligible to take the American
Board's certification examination in psychiatry; or
3.1.2 a clinical psychologist licensed to practice in this
state under [applicable section].
3.2 If the court orders an evaluation under division 3.1 of
this section, the evaluee shall be available at reasonable
times and places established by the examiner who will
conduct the evaluation. If an evaluee refuses to submit to a
complete evaluation, the court shall do one of the following:
3.2.1 stay divorce proceedings until the evaluee
undergoes evaluation; or
3.2.2 dismiss the divorce petition; or
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3.2.3 order the sheriff to take the evaluee into custody
and deliver the evaluee to a suitable location for
evaluation; or
3.2.4 hold the evaluee in contempt of court and order the
evaluee detained for evaluation in a jail, psychiatric
facility, or other suitable facility for a period not to
exceed ten days. In such case, the examiner will
evaluate the evaluee at the place of detention.
3.3 The examiner shall file a written report with the court
within thirty days after completion of the evaluation, and
the court shall provide copies of the report to both parties.
The report shall include:
3.3.1 the examiner's findings;
3.3.2 the facts in reasonable detail that provide the
basis for the examiner's findings;
3.3.3 the examiner's opinion about whether the evaluee:
3.3.3.1 can express a clear preference as to whether
the evaluee desires to divorce;
3.3.3.2 can assimilate and understand relevant facts
concerning the proceedings and their consequences;
3.3.3.3 can appreciate the evaluee's situation with
regard to those facts;
3.3.3.4 can participate in the proceedings using
rational thought processes;
3.3.3.5 can provide and does articulate reality-based
objections to remaining married as the evaluee's
reasons for seeking or pursuing a divorce and for
participating in divorce proceedings;
3.3.3.6 holds any patently false beliefs directly
related to the evaluee's seeking a divorce or as
reasons for seeking a divorce; and
3.3.3.7 has a mental disorder or impairment and the
nature of that disorder or impairment, if the
evidence so indicates;
3.3.4 the examiner's opinion concerning whether the
evaluee is competent;
3.3.5 if the examiner's conclusion is that the evaluee is
not competent, the examiner's opinion as to:
3.3.5.1 the cause of or reason for the incompetence;
3.3.5.2 the relationship between the incompetence
and any mental disorder or impairment that the
examiner has diagnosed;
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3.3.5.3 the likelihood of the evaluee's becoming
competent within one year if the evaluee receives
appropriate treatment;
3.3.5.4 what treatment is appropriate, both for the
evaluee's mental condition and for restoring
competence, if restoration appears possible;
3.3.5.5 the least restrictive alternative setting for
such treatment.
3.4 Neither the appointment of an examiner under this
section nor the testimony of an examiner precludes either
party from calling other witnesses or presenting other
evidence relevant to competence.
3.5 No statement that an evaluee makes in an examination
or hearing concerning competence shall be used against the
evaluee during any proceeding or concerning any issue not
related to the evaluee's competence. The examiner may not
be called as a witness during any proceeding unrelated to
competence unless both parties agree.3 85
As was noted earlier, the Model Statute is based on Alaska
and Ohio statutes concerning CMD and CST, and uses the fourpart formulation of competence promulgated by Appelbaum and
Grisso. Though the Model Statute's description of competence to
divorce goes beyond the holdings reviewed earlier, it is in accord
with several elements of those decisions. Those decisions refer to
the ability to express wishes that one's marriage be dissolved,"
understand proceedings,3 8 7 and make reasonable judgments
about personal matters.8 The notion that the petitioner should
be competent to testify, though present in some rulings,3 89 is not
a This section provides protections analogous to those found in many state
statutes that forbid using information disclosed in an evaluation of competence to
stand trial to prove guilt. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.B.007
(Vernon 2009). Inclusion of such statements vindicates a criminal defendant's
constitutional protection against self-incrimination. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S.
454, 462 (1981). Here, the protection is included so that evaluees would not be
dissuaded from undergoing evaluation out of concern that information would be used
to make later judgments during any subsequent disposition of their divorce petition.
3 See Higgason v. Higgason, 516 P.2d 289, 294 (Cal. 1973), overruled by Dawley
v. Dawley, 551 P.2d 323, 325 (Cal. 1976).
3 See Boyd v. Edwards, 446 N.E.2d 1151, 1158-59 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982);
Murray v. Murray, 426 S.E.2d 781, 784 (S.C. 1993).
1 See Northrop v. Northrop, File No. CN94-9882, Petition No. 1719-94, 1996
Del Fam. Ct. LEXIS 96, at *5 (July 26, 1996); Syno v. Syno, 594 A.2d 307, 311 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1991).
' See, e.g., Boyd, 446 N.E.2d at 1159.
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included in the Model Statute because it is not universally
required in all cases and because other means-such as services
of an attorney or a guardian ad litem-might fulfill or
satisfactorily effectuate a petitioner's needs. The Model Statute
does provide that a petitioner must be able to "reasonably
participate" in proceedings, however, which we believe
incorporates testifying relevantly, if a particular case will require
testimony.
The Model Statute's sections 1.4.2 and 3.3.3.6 provide that a
"patently false belief' ("PFB") is evidence of incompetence to
initiate or participate in divorce proceedings, while sections 4.1
and 2.3 state that simply having a mental disorder or simply
having bad reasons for desiring a divorce should not be barriers
to proceeding. These provisions have aims that parallel the
desiderata for assessments of competence to consent to research
endorsed by Saks. We explain these values shortly, but we first
explain Saks's notion of a PFB.
Saks suggests that respect for autonomy requires that a
standard for evaluating persons' beliefs about proposed
treatment or research should not require those persons to simply
"believe what most people would believe .... [W]e should
try. . . to characterize the standard in a way that does not refer
However, basing decisions on
essentially to majorities."39 0
"beliefs that obviously distort reality[, or] are based on little
evidence[, or] are indisputably false[, or] are patently delusional"
is a clear indication of incompetence in decisionmaking. 91 Saks
defines PFBs as "grossly improbable" beliefs, and notes that
these come in three varieties.3 92 (1) A belief may be bizarre, that
is, physically impossible or requiring a violation of "the laws of
nature as we know them,"93 such as a man's insisting he can fly
by flapping his arms. (2) A belief may, without violating the laws
of nature, declare a fact that is physically impossible or "so
improbable that the reasons for the person's holding the belief

N

Elyn R. Saks, Competency To Decide on Treatment and Research, in 2

RESEARCH INVOLVING PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS THAT MAY AFFECT
DECISIONMAKING CAPACITY 59, 71 (1999), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.

edu/nbac/capacity/volumeii.pdf.
391 Id.
2 Elyn

R. Saks et al., The California Scale of Appreciation:A New Instrument
To Measure the Appreciation Component of Capacity To Consent to Research, 10 Am.
J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 166, 168 (2002).
3 Id.
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are irrelevant,"3 9 4 such as a man untrained in medicine who
insists he is the world's greatest diagnostician. (3) A belief may
represent a "gross distortion of obvious facts," that is, a false
belief about physical events concerning which almost all people
would agree, for example, whether a spacecraft has landed on the
White House lawn."9 This category includes beliefs that, though
not obviously impossible or bizarre, are just obviously false. 9
In the Model Statute, the PFB criterion and the instruction
not to deem someone incompetent simply because of mental
illness serves to protect three interests held by individuals who
might seek a divorce. 9 '
(1) The PFB criterion protects
individuals who would, because of mental illness, be vulnerable
to errors and the consequences of decisions adverse to their real
interests.
(2) The PFB and mental illness criteria allow
individuals with unconventional or ill-considered beliefs that are
not obviously erroneous to act according to how they perceive the
world-that is, these criteria protect these individuals'
autonomy. (3) The mental illness criterion provides a protection
against discrimination simply because of a diagnosis; a person
with a severe mental disorder is deemed incompetent only
because his illness produces a major distortion in beliefs. Beliefs
that represent the sorts of distortion to which many of us are
vulnerable, and that lead many of us to bad decisions, are not a
basis for finding a party incompetent.
Finally, section 2.4 of the Model Statute provides two courses
for trial courts when the petitioner is incompetent to divorce:
staying or dismissing the proceedings. The option of appointing a
guardian ad litem is not included to conform to the notion,
underlying the majority rule, 98 that initiation of divorce
proceedings must involve the personal judgment of a petitioner
that a marriage should end.

394
395

396

Id.
Id.
See id. For useful background information, see generally ELYN R. SAKS,

REFUSING CARE: FORCED TREATMENT AND THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY ILL 180-

94 (2002) (elaborating on PFBs and their role in competence to refuse treatment).
39
See Saks et al., supra note 392.
398 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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Sample Questions for Courts

Model Statute section 3.3.4 calls for an examiner's express
opinion about an evaluee's competence to divorce. Respected
commentators maintain that mental health experts should not
express opinions on ultimate issues,3 99 and evidence rules or
cases occasionally enforce such a restriction.40 0 We believe,
however, that having mental health professionals offer views on
the ultimate issue-if such opinions are coupled with the
professional's rationale-can be helpful to courts. Knowing the
examining expert's view on the ultimate issue may help the
court40 1 see how the expert synthesizes a large body of clinical
data, and this provides the court with a context for
understanding those data and their relevance.
Examining
professionals cannot possibly report all the data they sense; their
reports to courts always represent a subset of data that the
examiner selectively reports because of apparent relevance.
Provided that courts feel free to disagree with the expert's
conclusion, an ultimate opinion helps the court grasp the
significance-from the expert's viewpoint-of reported data. This
puts the court in the best position to interpret those data in a
context and to recognize potential deficiencies in the data or the
expert's reasoning.
Courts are the ultimate arbiters of competence, however, and
should reach independent conclusions about a litigant's fitness to
proceed with a divorce. We think courts can best do this by
eliciting their own information from participants. Despite their
knowledge and legal skills, judges sometimes may feel
uncomfortable or unprepared to interview litigants who may
suffer from severe mental disorders. We also note that judges
39 See, e.g., Grant H. Morris et al., Assessing Competency Competently: Toward
a Rational Standard for Competency-To-Stand-TrialAssessments, 32 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 231, 243 (2004); Stephen Morse, Reforming Expert Testimony: An
Open Response from the Tower (and the Trenches), 6 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 45-46
(1982).
4
See FED. R. EVID. 704(b). For interpretations of Rule 704(b), see United
States v. Hillsberg, 812 F.2d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding that an expert may not
testify about whether the defendant had the capacity to conform his conduct to the
law); United States v. Buchbinder, 796 F.2d 910, 917-18 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that
an expert should not testify as to whether defendant had the requisite mental state
to defraud, though testimony about extent of defendant's depression was allowed).
401This paragraph discusses benefits to courts, but attorneys for the litigants
may also benefit from the examiner's views on the ultimate issue in ways we
describe here.
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often ask litigants questions answerable as "yes" or "no."402
Though this interview strategy may satisfy legal requirements, it
usually will not get at the kinds of data about comprehension,
reasoning, and appreciation that are crucial to evaluating
soundness of judgment.
In what follows, we offer a series of questions 403 that courts 404
may use to gather data relevant to reaching conclusions about
competence to divorce.405 In footnotes, we note how responses to
these questions may help courts address criteria for competence
under the Model Statute.4 06
1. Can you tell me what your goal is in coming to our court?
2. Would you summarize for me how you concluded you should
come to our court on this matter?
3. How did you decide whether to follow your lawyer's
recommendation concerning your case?
4. Is anything making it hard for you to follow your lawyer's
advice? 407
5. Please tell me in your own words what you understand about:
* what getting a divorce means,
* possible benefits and risks for you of getting a divorce,
* alternatives you have (or other courses of actions you
could take or other things you could do) besides getting
divorced, and
* the risks and benefits of choosing those alternatives.4 08
40 See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 411 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(holding that the trial judge failed to ascertain the full extent of defendant's mental
impairment and accepted his "guilty pleas after posing a series of routine questions
regarding his understanding of his legal rights and the offenses, to which Moran
gave largely monosyllabic answers"); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BENCHBOOK FOR U.S.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 6-7 (5th ed. 2007) (recommending judge's questions when
defendant wishes to proceed pro se, all be answerable with "yes" or "no").
40 We have adapted these questions from Appelbaum, supra note 327, at 1836
tbl.1.
40 These questions, with appropriate changes in wording, should also prove
helpful to examining experts conducting evaluations of competence to divorce.
40 We intend these as examples only. They should not be deemed requirements,
and judges should feel free to modify and expand upon them to fit the circumstances
of a specific case.
4 See Model Statute § 1.3, supra Part VI.B.
407 Questions 1 through 4 are most relevant to section 1.3.1. See supra Part VI.A.
That the word "divorce" does not appear in the questions is intentional; by omitting
such "hints," the court also can ascertain whether the litigant grasps what he or she
is doing. Questions 3 and 4 are appropriate only for litigants who have, or at some
point have had, attorney representation.
40 Question 5 is most relevant to the "understand[ing]" and "consequences"
portions of section 1.3.2. See supra Part VI.A.
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6. What do you believe is wrong with your marriage now?
7. How did you decide that you needed a divorce?
8. What leads you to believe that getting divorced is better
than remaining married?40
9. How do your think a divorce will affect you?
10. What else might happen?
11. What makes you believe a divorce will have those
results?
12. What do you think will happen to you if you do not get
divorced?
13. Why do you think your spouse has opposed a divorce? 4 10
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This Article suggests that legal recognition of a specific form
of incompetence-incompetence to initiate or maintain a divorce
action-would remedy an important gap in domestic relations
law as it exists in most jurisdictions. Legal recognition of a
specific incompetence to maintain a divorce action would let trial
courts respond to possibly "crazy" petitioners like Mr. Doe with
appropriate respect and concern. Barring individuals who lack
insight into their mental illnesses from pursuing divorces for
delusional reasons is consistent with several principles that
courts affirm in other legal arenas where it is common to deal
with psychiatrically impaired individuals. Requiring competence
to divorce:
* Protects a vulnerable mentally ill individual from
maintaining a legal action in the course of which that
individual might make other self-harming judgments.
* Protects a mentally ill person from suffering financial
insecurity, poorer mental health, and poorer physical
health that are known risks of getting divorced.

40 Questions 6 through 8 address sections 1.3.4-.5, that is, the party's reasoning
and whether the basis for seeking to divorce is realistic, as opposed to delusional).
See supra Part VI.A. In asking these questions, one tries to ascertain how well the
party can compare getting divorced to remaining married. In looking at the party's
reasons for seeking a divorce, the focus of inquiry is the process the party uses to
reach the decision, not whether getting divorced is a good idea. As section 1.4
entails, a party may make an ill-advised or unreasonable choice to seek divorce so
long as the motivation is not a patently false belief. See supra Part VI.A.
410 Questions 9 through 13 address sections 1.3.3 and 1.3.5, that is, whether the
party's appreciation is flawed by delusions or pathological distortions of reality. See
supra Part VI.A.
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Preserves the dignity and integrity of legal processes,
which was an important rationale for the alterations in
divorce law that took place in the 1960s and 1970s.
* Provides a means for courts to avoid implicitly
sanctioning, fostering, or promoting a mentally ill
person's acting on his delusions when such action has
potentially serious consequences for himself and others.
* Respects and enhances the freedom of a delusional
petitioner by preserving his safety and opportunity for
future self-expression when mental disability might
cause him to act improvidently.
In the absence of countervailing reasons, giving trial courts
the legal authority to dismiss or stay delusionally motivated,
potentially harmful divorce actions is a just and compassionate
response to the needs of loved ones of litigants who have serious
mental illnesses and-especially and most importantly-to the
needs of those litigants themselves.
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